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This thesis brings together Badiou, Beckett and Merleau-Ponty through the notion of 
the fragment. By reading Beckett’s works in light of Merleau-Ponty’s “The 
Intertwining --- The Chiasm” and Badiou’s writings on poetry, the notion of the 
fragment achieves temporality through the structure of the chiasm. The fragment can 
thus be understood as a temporal marker in Beckett’s late works that engages method, 
and more importantly, ethics. This thesis proposes the fragment as a mode of inter-
textuality across Beckett’s late oeuvre and between the three writers that reclaims the 
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Chapter 1  A Notion of the Fragment 
A fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be 
entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be 
complete in itself like a porcupine.  
 
       --- Schlegel, Fragment 206 from Athenaeum Fragments 
  
 The fragment as Schlegel and other early German Romantic contemporaries 
such as Novalis and Hölderlin had posited in the late eighteenth century was a concept 
rather than a symptom. It was a particle of deliberate incompleteness that in its self-
imposed artificiality pricked of a defensive totality. This was a reaction to the 
Classical pre-Romantic notion of the fragment which emphasized residual 
incompletion. The Classical fragment was seen as an indication or marker of a larger 
universe of change and chaos from which it had been fractured and isolated. In 
writing about the ideality of Schlegel’s notion of the fragment as presentation of Ideas 
(Darstellung), Rodolphe Gasché juxtaposes the Classical and Romantic fragment as 
disruption and totality: 
Undoubtedly, compared to the classical concept of the 
fragment, the Romantic fragment thematizes an 
incompletion that is universal, essential, and whose 
scope has no comparison to the incompletion to which 
the traditional notion of fragment alludes . . . Its focus 
lies on an essential incompletion, an incompletion that 
itself is a mode of fulfilment . . . As fragment, totality 
occurs. (Gasché xxxi) 
 
 
The Romantic fragment is thus disruption in the name of idea: in its self-fulfilling 
incompletion, it presents an individual totality in contrast to the Classical fragment 
which serves to represent universal incompletion in its rupture. Close to two centuries 
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later, critics writing about the fragmentation in Beckett’s works will hover between 
these two primary concepts of the fragment with hesitation. There is neither 
fragmentation for the fragment’s sake, nor fragmentation as a symptom of chaos. The 
chaos for Beckett lies in the imperative to express together with the inability to 
express; the fragment is the texture of the word borne out of this dilemma. As Beckett 
critic Dearlove puts it, Beckett is an “artist of fragmentation” who utilizes the 
fragment as form and shape for this dilemma. Through fragmentation, Beckett 
interrupts and effaces all inherent relationship between word and world. His fragment 
is one of Romantic presentation and Classical representation, expression and form: 
 
Beckett is often considered the latter type of artist, the 
artist of fragmentation. Whereas T.S. Eliot created 
from the broken segments about him a bulwark against 
uncertainty and fluidity, Beckett rigorously and 
unflinchingly explodes even those segments. His works 
progressively break down and strip away the tatters of 
conventional associations. The fragmentation is the 
result of Beckett’s unremitting efforts to find a shape 
for the possibility that no relationship exist between or 
among the artist, his art, and an external world. 
(Dearlove 39) 
   
Fifty pages later, Dearlove reaches the conclusion that these unremitting efforts on 
Beckett’s part demand as unremitting an effort on the reader’s part to decipher the 
fragments as tessellated constituents akin to the pieces of a mosaic. Through 
fragmentation and tessellation, Dearlove asserts that Beckett has created for himself a 





Beckett is the master of fragmentation, but his words 
demand concomitant efforts at tessellation. His works 
offer not the fragments Eliot shores against our ruin, 
nor the vision of unity Yeats projects for his Byzantine 
mosaic worker, but rather the fluidity and uncertainty 
of nonrelational art. The dual processes provide 
Beckett with new forms to express the possibility of a 
greater formlessness. (Dearlove 84) 
 
 
The fragment finds its totality not from a larger whole, but from its fluid relation to 
other fragments. One could see this reading as a post-structuralist revision of the 
Romantic fragment, where the fragment as Darstellung is distributed and recaptured 
through shifting systems of signification as a new medium of expression. Dearlove’s 
reading is convincing and representative of the trend of reading fragmentation in 
Beckett’s works. That the linguistic, imagist or even melodic shred (see Maier 2008) 
eventually constitutes a form of modernist connection or medium within Beckett’s 
works is frequently the way the fragment is situated beyond its Classical and 
Romantic notions, but still inexorably within their discourses of part and whole, chaos 
and order. Even in the instance when the fragment is seen to constitute a mode of 
inter-textuality between Beckett’s works, especially in his late works, it remains 
unclear how this inter-textual relation actually generates a new medium, shape or 
form that goes beyond these primary discourses. For instance, Santilli in Such Rare 
Citings: The Prose Poem in English Literature argues that it is the “consistent 
intertextuality” in the context of Beckett’s late prose that makes it possible for these 
works to defy both the sequentiality and fragmentation of time, but she does not 




Many commentators have argued for Beckett’s work to 
be viewed as a single sequence . . . In the end, 
however, I would propose a two-tiered approach. 
While there appears to be a comprehensive line of 
development in the compositional output, there is also, 
especially in the late, “modular” prose pieces, a 
consistent intertextuality. . . . Circumstance cannot be 
eliminated entirely but Beckett’s overt identification of 
context with intertextuality goes some way toward 
making both a shape for the text and a stillness that 
defies fragmentation of time, at least look like a 
possibility. (Santilli 179 – 180) 
 
Despite its lack of elaboration, Santilli’s argument raises an intriguing suggestion: 
fragmentation creates a relation of inter-textuality within Beckett’s late oeuvre that 
through its structure of stillness defies a “fragmentation of time”. There are two 
implications here, first, that inter-textuality lends itself to a form of stillness, and 
second, that linguistic or formal fragmentation lends itself to temporal continuity; if 
the second can be explicated, the first will follow.  
This thesis will follow from Santilli’s thought in establishing the fragment as 
temporal marker in three of Beckett’s late works, “neither”, “one dead of night” and 
Ohio Impromptu. What the fragment reveals about time in these works is a specific 
form of temporal continuity that takes its cue from Merleau-Ponty: time in these late 
Beckett works is neither linear nor circular, it is chiasmic. The movement of the 
fragment through Badiou’s schemas of exception and interruption is realized in 
Beckett’s works as a temporal marker that reveals time as chiasm. The fragment both 
enables the flight of the Idea and recalls the fragment of the letter, thus enabling time 
to escape and relapse at the same time. 
  There are three motivations to this thesis. First, it aims to add on to criticism 
on Beckett’s poetry that to date has received uneven attention; second, it will establish 
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an intricate temporal relationship between Beckett’s poetry, prose and drama that goes 
beyond fleeting inter-textuality; and third, it will highlight ideas of time and fragment 
in theories of Merleau-Ponty and Badiou that have rarely been applied to 
understanding Beckett’s works. I will touch on each of these motivations in 
succession for the rest of this chapter. 
 
The Bad Poet 
Despite having started and ended his writing career with poetry, Beckett’s 
status as poet remains an uneasy one. In the words of Marjorie Perloff, Beckett is 
commonly seen as “a writer who, like the young Joyce or the young Faulkner, wrote 
in his dim youth some negligible, clotted lyric poems but whose real work belongs to 
drama and fiction” (Perloff, “Between” 193). Criticism on these “negligible, clotted 
lyric poems” tends to be dismissive, if not somewhat brash. Richard Coe in a 1977 
review of Beckett’s first publication of the Collected Poems in English and French 
would go as far as to suggest that these poems in their completely un-poetic 
tendencies are headed towards “suicide”: 
 
It is a singular fact that the writer who has exercised 
the most profound influence over the third quarter of 
our by-and-large unpoetic century should be a poet 
whose formal “poems” oscillate between the obscure, 
the imitative and the awkward, who at one point 
abandoned his own language for another precisely in 
order to avoid writing poetry, and who has finally 
fashioned a form of linguistic denudation --- words 
used like a child’s set of building- blocks --- so utterly 
opposed to poetry in the Tennysonian sense that it 





What Coe deems politely as an oscillation between “the obscure, the imitative and the 
awkward” is to Derek Mahon simply an instance of a bad poem: 
 
Let us not pretend, either, that he is a great poet; 
obviously he is not. He is a minor and idiosyncratic 
poet, though an interesting one, and it is as such that I 
propose to consider him, regardless (almost) of his 
achievements in other spheres. Thus I hasten to blurt, 
as I have long wished to blurt, that Whoroscope is such 
a bad poem there is nothing of consequence to be said 
of it; even the Notes, unlike Eliot’s Notes to The Waste 
Land, have nothing to recommend them. (Mahon 88) 
 
 
Amidst such endless brash criticism (even though Mahon does go on to make a strong 
case for Beckett’s poetry), interest in Beckett’s poetry has been resuscitated in three 
main ways. First and most strongly, by a group of Irish poets including MacNeice, 
Mahon and Heaney, who have acknowledged Beckett for writing poetry that 
confronts the grey and the bleak through questions of self and place (see Nixon 2005 
for a brief outline). Second, by literary theorists and critics concerned with processes 
of translation, since Beckett not only translated many of his own poems, but also other 
French poets, including Rimbaud, Apollinaire and Éluard. McGuire, for instance, has 
made a case for the notion of the metapoem generated through the interval of 
Beckett’s translations. This metapoem is an “interlinear version” of both the French 
and English versions of the same poem, and creates “a synthetic, unutterable set of 
signifieds” which dissolves the materiality of the word (McGuire 263). Third, by a 
group of dedicated Beckett scholars including Ruby Cohn, Marjorie Perloff and 
Lawrence Harvey,  who have ploughed through most of Beckett’s very difficult early-
mid poetry allusion by allusion, word for word. Perloff’s preliminary analysis of 
“Eneug I”, for instance, painstakingly unravels allusions and references to Ovid, 
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Dante, Eliot, Joyce, Zukofsky and Apollinaire, while bringing to our attention 
Beckett’s unusual choice of vocabulary, such as the mention of the cang which is a 
Chinese torture instrument (Perloff 213). Amidst such scholarship, this thesis instead 
focuses on his late poetry (in particular “one dead of night”) and examines its relation 
to other works in his late oeuvre. Unlike his early poetry, much of Beckett’s late 
poetry is not self-contained, but is rather intricately inter-woven into the context of his 
other works. What Richard Coe refers to as the building blocks of the “linguistic 
denudation” in Beckett’s early poetry are now displaced as inter-textual hooks that 
pick up image after image in the afterthought of Beckett’s late works.  The allusions 
and references have shifted from the ghosts of the literary canon to those of his 
oeuvre, and I will show how the fragment serves as both form and time for these 
phantom traces. 
 
The Missing Word 
 This brings me to my second motivation, which is to establish an intricate 
temporal relationship between these three works that traverse three different genres 
across the span of six years from 1976 to 1981. A brief historical background to these 
three works will shore up some interesting coincidences. 1976 marks the year when 
Beckett met the composer Morton Feldman in Berlin, and having established their 
mutual dislike for opera, Beckett sent Feldman a postcard a few weeks later bearing 
the opening lines of what would evolve into the prose “neither”. Feldman would go 
on in 1977 to set “neither” to music in his anti-opera of the same name, while 
“neither” in its prose form would undergo a truncated and somewhat hazardous 
publication history which involved erroneous background information, a wrongly 
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capitalized single-word title, an inclusion of an editor’s question mark, and a missing 
word (see Gontarski 284). All these were further compounded by Beckett’s insistence 
that the 87-word piece had a story to it and was therefore prose and not poetry, despite 
its presentation with line breaks, which resulted in its omission from two publications. 
This is merely an exemplification of Beckett’s oft-quoted line to his American 
publisher in 1957, that “[i]f we can't keep our genres more or less distinct, or extricate 
them from the confusion that has them where they are, we might as well go home and 
lie down” (quoted in Campbell 91 – 92). The truncation that “neither” underwent, 
Ohio Impromptu would likewise experience but under Beckett’s own hands. Like 
“neither”, Beckett had written Ohio Impromptu in 1981 upon request, this time from 
Stan Gontarski for a dramatic piece to be performed at an academic symposium in 
Columbus, Ohio, to honour Beckett’s seventy-fifth birthday.  The piece started off as 
a monologue, the fragments of which are now collected at Reading, and the final 
version of Ohio Impromptu emerged only after ten months and at least four versions 
(Astier 396). Seelig does a detailed reading of the implication of these drafts on the 
final product in “Beckett’s Dying Remains: The Process of Playwriting in the Ohio 
Impromptu Manuscripts”, and argues that the fragmentation of self and 
autobiographical voice in the final product had begun in an elaborate drafting process 
consisting of three different vantage points:  “I”, “he” and “they”. These vantage 
points not only sift through the transformation of self and voice, but actually 





The elaborate derangement of what began as a 
monologue by “I” – that is, by Beckett himself (or at 
least the closest imaginable record of Beckett’s voice) 
– is precisely what enables the text of Ohio Impromptu 
to evolve beyond mere autobiography. This 
fragmentation occurs in three basic steps, converting 
the heavily autobiographical monologue of (1) “I” into 
a monologue about (2) “he,” and finally evolving into a 
story about (3) “they.” . . . . In the final text, Reader 
reads from an autobiography in the third person. From 
this vantage point, Reader is the (1) “I” who reads 
about a (2) “he,” who simultaneously resembles 
himself and Listener, or (3) “they.”  (Seelig)  
 
  
This process of fragmentation nudges into the depths of both dramatic and 
autobiographical presence as a persistent derangement that enacts but nullifies death. 
Many Beckett scholars writing on Ohio Impromptu have likewise explored such 
inversions of the play, chief among the inversions of identity and narrative structure. 
Abbott does such a reading in Beckett Writing Beckett: The Author in the Autograph 
where his description of the inversions of narrative structure resembles that of a set of 
Russian dolls in which incompletion encloses infinity: 
 
This complexity is mirrored in the action of the play 
and at the same time augmented. The book being read 
is an autobiography in the third person. It is Listener’s 
story, but in a strange loop like those of A Piece of 
Monologue it includes within Listener’s story the 
reading of Listener’s story. . . . Not only does the book 
include the reading of the story but it extends beyond 
the end of its own reading . . . (Abbott 174) 
 
While Abbott is interested in unravelling the simultaneous intricacies interior and 
exterior to the form of the play, Kathleen O’Gorman sees these intricacies as 
ultimately emerging from the tension of the central utterance of the play, “With never 
a word exchanged they grew to be as one”. She analyzes this utterance within the 
15 
 
tenets of the speech act and concludes that while the utterance may not completely 
nullify the main narrative and structural transformations of the play that critics have 
frequently argued for or taken for granted, it puts up a resistance to any easy 
conclusion of the play as a neat conflation or fulfilment of the relationship between 
Reader and Listener: 
The utterance sets in motion a dialectic of identity and 
difference in which the similarity of the opposing 
forces --- sight/sound, narrative/dramatic, 
presence/absence, singularity/duality --- sustains as 
well as a dialectic of authority. In the end, neither 
element in any of the pairings prevails; they 
continuously vie for primacy, giving a dynamic 
movement to the play which it would otherwise lack. 
The illocutionary force of the speech act in Ohio 
Impromptu compels the audience to confer 
signification, even as it resists such a gesture. 
(O’Gorman 118) 
 
The examples of such readings that explicate the binaries and dialectics of Ohio 
Impromptu are profound and endless. McMullan makes a similarly strong case in 
Theatre on Trial, arguing for the play as a process of creation, but one that eventually 
seeks momentary stillness and solace in the “unspeakable home” of “neither”:  
In the narrative, after the last reading has ended, the 
two figures remain quite still, their bodies petrified, 
while the “self” has passed beyond form and even 
being, beyond all dualities and dichotomies, to the 
ultimate comfort evoked in one of Beckett’s poems 
entitled “Neither”. (McMullan 120) 
 
It is at this point that we return to the year 1976, where we now understand from 
Beckett’s note to Feldman that “neither” is not a poem, and certainly not capitalized 
as in McMullan’s quote above. The loopings of time in literary criticism are 
concurrent with the fractures in history: two works, countless errors and endless 
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fragmentation. In the generation of this relapse we encounter the minute work of “one 
dead of night” which Beckett had written in 1977 in between these two works, and 
which critics have left completely untouched. It is within this tight web of overlapping 
and concurrent histories of these three works that I wish to read between them an 
inter-textuality of time generated through the chiasm of the fragment, which is a 
concept that the third chapter of this thesis will explain in detail. Not only will I 
explicate the “strange loop” in Ohio Impromptu with a structure of temporality, I will 
also account for the insistence of “neither” as a prose with narrative contours and as 
poem in its formal presentation. In the interval of these two major works will be the 
neglected “one dead of night” which I will exemplify in its sensitivity to image and 
space. These will be done through three primary works: Badiou’s “Mallarmé’s 
Method: Subtraction and Isolation” and “Rimbaud’s Method: Interruption” which 
were published in Conditions in 2008, and Merleau-Ponty’s “The Intertwining --- The 
Chiasm” which was left incomplete and unpublished by the time of his death in 1961. 
     Three men writing in French but they could not be any more far apart: 
Merleau-Ponty writing in the mid-twentieth century as a phenomenologist concerned 
with embodied being and perception, Badiou writing at the turn of the twenty-first 
century on the notions of truth and event against the post-modern, and Beckett stuck 
in between, before, somewhere, writing on the none, the nothing, the un-word beyond 
the word. But it is on this void that they converge briefly, where Merleau-Ponty talks 
about the silent clasp between the sensed and the sense, and Badiou on the contour of 
nothingness that exception beholds in anticipation of the truth. The silent and the 
nothingness, in turn, is what Beckett writes about, and on, almost in, for all his life. 
But there is no sustained study to date that brings all three writers together. This thesis 
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thus utters this missing word by engaging the ideas on time and fragment in the works 
of these three writers. Not only will it perform a compounded inter-textual reading 
within Beckett’s works and between the three writers, it will also bring to light some 
crucial ideas in Badiou and Merleau-Ponty that have not been explored in Beckett 
studies. Such an explication will reveal the missing word to be the human body that 
lies at the hinge between word and image. This is a proposition that the last chapter of 
this thesis will explore. 
 
Badiou: Method and Ethics 
  Badiou is a familiar name in Beckett studies. Only in 2003 were Badiou’s 
writings on Beckett compiled in the slim collection On Beckett, and many Beckett 
scholars, including Jean-Michel Rabaté and Andrew Gibson, have drawn heavily from 
these four pieces which provide much insight into Beckett’s prose, especially 
Worstward Ho and the trilogy. The major insight that Badiou has provided for Beckett 
studies is first of method, and second of ethics. Badiou has called to attention a 
rigorous systematicity that underlies Beckett’s construction of the literary work. This 
systematicity, which almost approaches the generic character of a procedure or 
strategy, pushes forth the thought of the work that activates truth rather than any form 
of nihilistic poetics. In their very illuminating introduction to Badiou’s On Beckett, 
Alberto Toscano and Nina Power highlight this insight of method as an “unapologetic 





If anything marks out Badiou's approach to the literary 
and stage works of Samuel Beckett, it is the steadfast 
conviction that in order to really think through their 
uniqueness, a thorough and unapologetic operation of 
formalisation is in order, one demonstrating the 
ultimately unequivocal character of Beckett's thought, 
even (or especially) in what concerns its oscillations 
and aporias. This position, which can be expediently 
summarised as a concern with method --- and which 
does not exclude careful considerations of both the 
methods of failure and the failures of method --- is 
undoubtedly what makes these commentaries so alien 
to the more or less pervasive vision of Beckett as a 
relentlessly elusive and anti -systematic writer. (Power 
and Toscano XVII)  
 
 What is refreshing about Badiou’s position is its stakes in method for ethics. While 
Beckett scholars have long established the primacy of failure and the failure of 
method in many of Beckett’s key works, Badiou is the key figure to bring to attention 
a formalisation of a method of failure which therefore negates nihilism. This 
formalistic but ethical concern with method is most clearly observed in Badiou’s 
piece “The Writing of the Generic” where he detects in Beckett’s writing a 
“fundamental tendency towards the generic”. This is a tendency characterized by a 
simultaneous reduction and subtraction of writing to its bare functions of questioning 
humanity: 
By “generic” desire I understand the reduction of the 
complexity of experience to a few principal functions, 
the treatment in writing of that which alone constitutes 
an essential determination. For Beckett, writing is an 
act governed by a severe principle of economy. It is 
necessary to subtract more and more of everything that 
figures as circumstantial ornament, all peripheral 
distraction, in order to exhibit or to detach those rare 
functions to which writing can and should restrict 





That Beckett’s writing is governed by a necessity, and to some point an obsession, to 
subtract and detach has been taken up by many Beckett scholars in the past (see for 
instance, Rosemary Pountney’s brilliant Theatre of Shadows). But that this necessity 
seeks its destination in a generic humanity is a unique insight. The ethical dimension 
to Beckett that Badiou spares no hesitation in explicating in spite of Beckett’s 
characters constantly falling, getting lost, and most of all, failing, is what Andrew 
Gibson deems a faith in both possibility and transformation that ultimately subsists 
upon the “transformation of language itself”: 
 
Beckett's art is founded on a fierce resistance to doxa. 
It opens up a space for a different construction of the 
world through an axiomatic procedure whose mode is 
hypothesis. Whilst failure never ceases to haunt this 
project, tentatively, contradictorily, fitfully, and by a 
variety of different means, Beckett edges towards a 
faith in possibility. This is also a faith in transformation 
whose token is the transformation of language itself. 
(Gibson 135 – 136) 
 
Gibson sees Badiou’s method as having a bearing on the ethics of language and 
humanity in face of a “century of disaster” (136).  It is with this insight in mind that 
one brings into dialogue Badiou and Beckett’s late works. Instead of appropriating the 
method of the generic which Badiou aligns with much of Beckett’s prose and some 
plays, I will take up two other methods that Badiou proposes through the French poets 
Mallarmé and Rimbaud, that of exception and interruption respectively, to read 
alongside Beckett’s short prose “neither” and the poem “one dead of night”. This 
move might raise some objections amongst Badiou/Beckett critics for the three 
methods are not only distinct, but are somewhat inversions of the other, as well 
summarized by Power and Toscano in their introduction to Badiou’s On Beckett. 
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While Rimbaud’s interruption is characterized by the “now” at which the word 
ruptures when encountered with the undecidable, and Mallarmé’s exception by the 
“after” through which the event is re-captured through the distance of its remaining 
lack, Beckett’s method of the generic is marked by the “before” which rigorously 
prepares for the conditions of the event to pass through: 
 
Forcing our schematisation somewhat, we could say 
that if Rimbaud shows us the abdication of language in 
the face of the present demands of the undecidable, and 
Mallarmé the retrospective detection of the traces of a 
vanished novelty, Badiou's Beckett is almost (and this 
“almost” marks the very place of the event in Beckett's 
work) wholly devoted to delineating the conditions 
demanded for the emergence of truth and novelty. . . . 
It could therefore be said that Beckett's method partly 
inverts the methods of the two other writers considered 
by Badiou. (Power and Toscano XX – XXI) 
 
 
The event in Badiou’s Beckett is always characterized by the generic preparation of a 
method of subtraction prior to it, whereas the event in Badiou’s Mallarmé and 
Rimbaud is characterized through its undecidability which exception and interruption 
respectively trace (Badiou, “Mallarmé” 53). While Power and Toscano have 
delineated a very useful schematization for understanding the place and temporality of 
the event in the three different methods and writers, Beckett’s poetry and prose-poetic 
pieces will attempt many times over to deny this categorization for they are rigidly but 
unevenly formalized pieces across the canon. This is why there can be no neat 
categorization or criticism of Beckett’s poetry in its entirety because of their radical 
unevenness in style and form which fall insistently out of place alongside commonly-
held categorizations of Beckett’s plays and prose (see Badiou’s and Deleuze’s 
categorizations, for instance). A quick comparison of “Brief Dream” and the opening 
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of “what is the word”, Beckett’s last two poems, will show the fluctuations in style, 
gesture and even the mode of subtraction in Beckett’s poetry: 
 
Go end there 
One fine day 
Where never till then 
Till as much as to say 
No matter where 
No matter when 
 




folly for to --- 
for to --- 
what is the word --- 
folly from this --- 
all this --- 
folly from all this --- 
given --- 
folly given all this ---  
seeing --- 
folly seeing all this --- 
this --- 
 
(Opening of “what is the word”, Oct 1988, 115) 
 
If “almost”, according to Power and Toscano’s schematization above, marks the place 
of the event in Beckett's work, then it does so most prominently, and most terribly 
close to the dehiscence of life that is time, in his poetry. Just as it will be hard to fit 
both “Brief Dream” and “what is the word” into the categorization of the “courageous 
preparation for the event (“before”)”, I shall likewise read “neither” and “one dead of 
night” in the vein of Mallarmé’s operation of exception and Rimbaud’s operation of 
interruption respectively with the same amount of carefulness and awareness. I will 
show that “neither” and “one dead of night” execute two different forms of temporal 
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openings through the thought-event of the poem, which subsequently inform our 
reading of Ohio Impromptu as a play with a strange temporal loop. This loop is the 
inter-textual intricacy of time that operates across the three works through the chiasm 
of the fragment, which eventually enables flight ---- not a courageous preparation for 
the event per se, but a courageous testament to the word, which is the space of the 
event before, during, and even after its utterance. 
 
Event, Undecidability, Truth 
 As we negotiate the turn from Badiou to Merleau-Ponty, a clarification of a 
few key terms is in order. To recapitulate: according to Badiou, the poem donates the 
event through its undecidability which the schemas of exception and interruption trace 
and name in different ways. But what is the event and why is it undecidable? In 
Badiou’s own words, the event is characterized by the multiple, and is offered to us as 
thought-event in poetry. The poem is a space of an operation, and as an operation 
which takes place through language, becomes an event of thought as thought: 
 
The rule is simple: To enter into the poem --- not in 
order to know what it means, but rather to think what 
happens in it. Because the poem is an operation, it is 
also an event. The poem takes place. The superficial 
enigma points to this taking place. It offers us a taking 
place in language. (Badiou, Inaesthetics 29) 
 
The poem is therefore not a description or mere expression, but an operation that 
thinks the thought of the event: the poem donates the event as thought, and the 
character of this event-thought is its ultimate undecidability. In Badiou’s words, the 
poem gives us “the donation of the event with its undecidability” (Badiou, 
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“Mallarmé”, 53). What is the undecidability of the event? In “Rimbaud’s Method”, 
Badiou clearly clarifies that this undecidability is not any trivial dilemma between two 
choices, but is rather an undecidable division of “being itself, of being qua being” that 
is initiated by the event that has already disappeared (74). The event confronts the 
poem with this undecidable divide in seeing, and the two schemas of Mallarmé’s 
exception and Rimbaud’s interruption can be most clearly differentiated in their 
treatment of this undecidability. While interruption is impatient in seizing this 
undecidability in an instant, exception leaves this undecidability undecided through a 
patient operation of isolation that keeps eternity at a distance (Badiou, “Rimbaud” 
87). It is through the donation of the event with its undecidability that the poem yields 
the Idea in service of truth. According to Badiou, truth is a procedure. It is only 
revealed by chance in an artwork through the rupture of an event: 
In the final analysis, the pertinent unit for a thinking of 
art as an immanent and singular truth is thus neither the 
work nor the author, but rather the artistic 
configuration initiated by an eventual rupture (which in 
general renders a prior configuration obsolete). This 
configuration, which is a generic multiple, possesses 
neither a proper name nor a proper contour, not even a 
possible totalization in terms of a single predicate. It 




Truth thus emerges in the poem as a procedure or a configuration through the 
operations of exception and interruption. This truth, because multiple and only 
imperfectly named, can be located in the form of an Idea, which Badiou delineates as 
“being’s indifference to every relation” (“Mallarmé” 59). It is a “vision of being in the 
Number” (“Rimbaud” 87) that is evacuated from all illusion of the familiar and the 
familial. This thesis thus proposes flight as Idea in three of Beckett’s works. The 
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flight of the fragment is a truth procedure that is gained through a rigorous 
formalisation of the works of the three writers. Where the Idea takes flight, the body is 
revealed at the hinge of its departure. This is a hinge between word and image, which 
the last chapter of the thesis will explicate in conclusion. 
 
Merleau-Ponty and the Chiasm 
We come finally to Merleau-Ponty who is starting to make an appearance in 
Beckett’s studies. A recent publication in 2009, Beckett and Phenomenology, features 
two essays that apprehend the relationship between Beckett’s works and Merleau-
Ponty’s writings. Ulrika Maude’s “ “Material of a Strictly Peculiar Order”: Beckett, 
Merleau-Ponty and Perception ” looks at the notion of embodied perception and how 
it informs Beckett’s aesthetic through a close reading of his early prose, while Steven 
Matthews’ “Bodily Histories: Beckett and the Phenomenological Approach to the 
Other” examines the role of intersubjective perception in formulating histories in 
Beckett’s immediate post-war works. Stanton Garner in his 1993 paper "Still Living 
Flesh": Beckett, Merleau-Ponty, and the Phenomenological Body” had likewise 
examined the corporeality of perception in Beckett’s works through Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception, but with an emphasis on the deformation of body 
inherent in the performative space of Beckett’s theatre. He argues that issues of 
disappearance and corporeal dysfunction in Beckett’s late dramatic works can be 




If Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology calls into focus a 
specifically corporeal dynamic at work in Beckett's 
handling of subjectivity, it is equally true that Beckett's 
late plays suggest the radical implications of this 
dynamic. . . Beckett's drama pursues these directions, 
in ways that parallel the work of more recent 
phenomenologists of the body who have revised the 
philosophy of corporeality inherited from Merleau-
Ponty. (Garner 452) 
 
This thesis introduces to this growing scholarship of Merleau-Ponty and Beckett an 
emphasis on time which is constantly neglected by critics, even though it is integral to 
and, in fact, constitutive of embodied perception or subjectivity. Specifically, I will 
look into detail at the structure of time as chiasm, as introduced in Merleau-Ponty’s 
“The Intertwining --- The Chiasm”, which was to be the last chapter of his 
unpublished work The Visible and The Invisible. It was in the “Working Notes” to this 
chapter that Merleau-Ponty pursued the notion of the chiasm in great detail, from its 
basic structure of a criss-crossing or reversal of two constituents (as in an “X” shape), 
to a movement of a relationship that incorporates reversibility without entailing 
dialectic synthesis. Because Merleau-Ponty’s writings on time are frequently sifted 
into his main works on perception, subjectivity or art, literary criticism has seen only 
a few works giving these ideas the main stage, and only most prominently in Glen A 
Mazis’s “Merleau-Ponty and the “Backward Flow” of Time: The Reversibility of 
Temporality and the Temporality of Reversibility” (1992). This is probably the most 
in-depth explication of Merleau-Ponty’s late ideas on time, and Mazis has in fact gone 
on to read Merleau-Ponty alongside works of Joyce and Atwood. For instance, he 
takes up Merleau-Ponty’s concept of temporal depths constituted between the flesh of 
the body and world and reads it alongside the narrator in Atwood’s novel, Surfacing, 
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who encounters in her body and the physical landscape the slippage between the past 
and the present (60 – 61). This thesis, in turn, takes Merleau-Ponty’s structure of the 
chiasm as the framework for understanding the movement of the fragment which 
drives the temporality of Beckett’s late works. The chiasm acts as the hinge for the 
flow of the fragment between the three writers, and it is, in fact, the invisibility of this 
hinge that enables the flight of the fragment.   Not only the invisibility but the failure, 
Merleau-Ponty would say; it is the failure of this hinge to coincide that gives us “a 
sort of reflection by Ecstasy” (255). At this point we come back to the brief 
convergence of these three writers, who at some point or other wrote in the same 
language and space, and who rigorously worked through the ethics and dynamics of 
the failure and silence of the word, its thought, this condition. To return to Santilli’s 
suggestion that fragmentation creates a relation of inter-textuality in Beckett’s late 
works that establishes temporal continuity through stillness, one can assert now that 
this relation is one that can only be recuperated through a rigorous formalisation of 












Chapter 2  Contour of Nothingness: “neither” 
aller là où jamais avant   go where never before 
à peine là que là toujours   no sooner there than there always 
où que là où jamais avant   no matter where never before 
à peine là que là toujours   no sooner there than there always 
  
--- Beckett, “Là”, Jan 1987 --- Beckett, English trans of “Là”, 
Jan 1987  
 
Go end there 
One fine day 
Where never till then 
Till as much as to say 
No matter where 
No matter when 
 
--- Beckett, “Brief Dream”, Nov 1987 
 
 
 “Brief Dream” draws upon the recursive movement of the only verb in “Là”, 
“go”, and extends it in the destination of its imperative. This destination of the 
imperative is also the destination of subtraction. Where “Là” fixates the site of 
movement as “where never before”, “Brief Dream” displaces it as “there”; where 
“Là” in turn designates “there” with a temporal opening of “no sooner there than there 
always”, “Brief Dream” closes this door of im/permanence with “one fine day”. But 
in being the destination of the imperative, this day befalls its own negation of “one” 
through the repetition of “no matter” in “Brief Dream” in place of “no sooner” in 
“Là”. Where there was a constant retrieval of the belated, we now have the slipping 
under of the imperative. No matter where or when, the day will not see its arrival, but 
arrive it must: this is the destination of the imperative which is not only characterized 
by the subtractive, but is subtraction itself. The notion of subtraction, according to 
Badiou, is to be differentiated from extraction in its movement. While extraction 
“draws from or forth”, subtraction instead “draws under” and is imminently plural 
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(Badiou, “Subtraction” 114). “Brief Dream” thus subtracts from “Là” the recursive 
movement of “go”, but in drawing under the reiteration of its belatedness (“no sooner 
there than there always”), subsists in the imperative of “going” by distributing it in the 
interval of “no matter where” and “no matter when”. The isolation of this site of the 
imperative in a no-where (what Badiou will term the black-grey) is the poem’s 
“fragment of candour” (Badiou, “Mallarmé” 61) where “the infinite at last escapes the 
family” (67). 
 
Contour of Nothingness, Contour of Ruin 
     How does the fragment enable flight? In Badiou’s comparison of Mallarmé 
and Rimbaud’s poetry, the fragment can be understood at the juncture of suture and 
scission. In Mallarmé’s poetics of exception towards purification, the fragment is 
isolated through a schema of rupture which in turn brings forth a “contour of 
nothingness” (“Mallarmé” 60), whereas in Rimbaud’s poetics of interruption towards 
the thought of the undecidable, the fragment is performed through the poem’s abrupt 
splitting in establishing a “contour of ruin” (“Rimbaud” 71). The fragment is not so 
much a remnant of a whole as it is a remnant of a process, and where the processes of 
exception and interruption are concerned, it is a remnant of disappearing carrying with 
it a trace of flight.  
 Badiou in “Mallarmé’s Method: Subtraction and Isolation” delineates two 
schemas of rupture in Mallarmé’s poetry that evacuates the poem from its opening 
context. This evacuation serves to “break with the links in which the poem’s starting 
point is enchained” and “undo the representational illusion of natural relations or 
conventional relationships” (60). Both schemas, separation and isolation, are 
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implemented in view of attaining purity. Purity, which Badiou refers to as “the stake 
of poetry”, can be understood as a disjunctive enactment of isolation within the Idea:  
 
But what is purity? It consists, I would argue, in the 
composition of an Idea that as such is no longer 
retained in any bond. This is an idea that captures 
being’s indifference to every relation, that captures its 
separated scintillation, its multiplicity without Whole. . 
. . Extirpated from the rule of the relation, subtracted as 
much from nature as from the pathos of consciousness, 
placed on a background of nothingness, facing the 
latent void of the pure multiple, being shines --- distant, 
but measurable in truth. Seized by the poem’s 
operation, the purity of being, like that of the dancer’s 
gesture, yields ‘the nudity of your concepts’, and writes 
‘your vision’ ‘like a sign which she is’. (59 – 60) 
 
It is at this point that the “fragment of candour” can be understood, for Badiou writes 
that “[t]o succeed in isolating a ‘fragment of candour’ is what is required of the poem 
in the Idea’s service” (61). Here, “candour” must be understood as nothing other than 
truth, which for Badiou, is inexplicably bound to the flight of the infinite beyond the 
familial. This is a flight that opens to eternity, but through the poetics of exception has 
kept eternity “at a distance” (Badiou, “Rimbaud” 87). Such an eternity harks between 
instantaneity and impermanence --- it is at once the “always of time” and what, “in a 
figure brimming over with nostalgia, one salutes in what one will never see again” 
(Badiou, “Rimbaud” 78 – 79). This, as we will see in the last chapter, is the figure of 
Beckett’s Reader/Listener in Ohio Impromptu who in the final look upon himself at 
the end of the play recollects presence and resuscitates the present. In the lacuna of his 
reflection lies this fragment of candour--- this shred of an escaped eternity --- for 
which eternity has been enacted but kept at distance through subtraction and isolation. 
Mallarmé through Badiou gives Beckett the poetics of the fragment through 
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exception, but Beckett gives this poetics a figment of time, which lets the fragment 
take flight. 
  In this chapter, I will examine the notion of fragment as temporal marker in 
Beckett’s short prose “neither” through a negotiation with Badiou’s writing on 
Mallarmé. I will first appropriate Badiou’s tripartite framework of negation onto 
“neither”, and subsequently show how isolation, as a schema of rupture, sets in to 
enable the flight of the fragment. The temporal structure of this fragment is, however, 
chiasmic due to the nature of eternity which it keeps at bay. 
 Badiou begins his analysis of Mallarmé by positing three subtractive 
operations through which the poem “inscribes the absence or hush” (“Mallarmé” 49). 
These three operations, when further supplemented by the two schemas of rupture 
mentioned above, are fundamental types of negation that set the conditions for 
thought in the poem towards purification. Badiou clearly distinguishes these three 
operations by means of their subtractive force towards lack and, by implication, truth: 
 
--- vanishing, whose value lies in marking 
--- cancellation, which avers the undecidable and 
sustains the truth 
--- foreclosure, which points to the unnameable, and 
fixes the uncrossable limit of a truth-process. (57) 
 
 
Here I posit that the subtractive force of these three procedures of negation toward 
lack and truth can in fact be interpreted through the process of the fragment: 1) 
vanishing as fragment, where the wreckage of the word shores up to trace 
disappearance; 2) cancellation as fragmenting, where vanishing is abolished through 
the scission of disappearance; and 3) foreclosure as the fragmented where the 
unsubstitutable reveals the site of radical absence as having no trace from and for 
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which to return (the zone of the unnameable). In other words the subtractive machine 
can be seen as forming the conditions of the poem through the movement of the 
fragment. This movement is what gives “neither” a figment of history and a 
semblance of time. 
 
First Subtractive Operation: Vanishing as Fragment 
 The first subtractive operation, vanishing, is built upon a trace as a name of the 
event. This trace “supplements the nudity of place” and names the event in its 
abolishing through what Badiou assigns as “vanishing terms” (51). The event can only 
be understood through its abolishing and disappearance; the vanishing terms as the 
derivative movement of the fragment form the wreckage of the word to evoke the 
dissolution of the event: 
 
To underline that the name of the event can only be 
implied from its disappearance, Mallarmé then 
composes metonymic chains, built upon the vanishing 
term liable to give body to the edges of inexistence. 
The ship is evoked only by the abolition not even of it 
as a whole but of its mast, its last piece of wreckage, 
and by the hypothetical call of an inaudible horn. The 
siren is resolved into her own childhood tresses, which 
in the end is but a single, white hair. (51) 
 
 
 Badiou assigns the ship and the Siren in Mallarmé’s 1895 poem “Hushed to the 
Crushing Cloud” (“A La Nue Accablante Tu”) as the vanishing terms that evoke the 
event through their fragments (the wreckage of the ship and the hair of the Siren). 
Badiou goes on to render Mallarmé’s poem in its “latent prose” from which the rest of 





A la nue accablante tu    Hushed to the crushing cloud 
Basse de basalte et de laves   Basalt and lava its form 
A même les échos escalves   Even to echoes subdued 
Par une trompe sans vertu   By an ineffectual horn 
 
Quel sépulcral naufrage (tu   What shipwreck sepulchral has bowed 
Le sais, écume, mais y baves)  (You know this, but slobber on, foam) 
Suprême une entre les épaves   The mast, supreme in a crowd 
Abolit le mât dévêtu    Of flotsam and jetsam, though torn 
Ou cela que furibond faute   Or will that which in fury defaulted 
De quelque perdition haute   From some perdition exalted 
Tout l’abîme vain éployé   (The vain abyss outspread) 
 
Dans le si blanc cheveu qui traîne  Have stingily drowned in the swirl 
Avarement aura noyé    Of a white hair’s trailing thread 
Le flanc enfant d’une sirène.   The flank of a young Siren girl. 
 
What shipwreck, then, has engulfed even the mast and 
torn sails that were the last remnants of a ship? On the 
ocean we see the foam, which is the trace of this 
disaster, and which knows about it but says nothing. 
The ship’s horn, which might have alerted us, could not 
make itself heard; it was powerless to do so on this low 
sky and sombre sea, which, the colour of volcanic rock, 
imprisoned the possible echo of a distress call. 
 
Unless, furious at not having had any ship to make 
disappear, the abyss (sky and sea) swallowed a Siren, 
of which the white foam would be no more than a 
trailing hair. (Badiou 51) 
 
 
The event of the poem is therefore split in the interval between the sinking of the ship 
and the dive of the Siren, both of which are conjoined in their very disappearance in 
the body of the trace (the foam on the ocean). The thought process of vanishing in 































as the trace of 
Sinking of ship Dive of Siren 
Ship Siren 
which as an event already 
abolished, can only be implied by 
the vanishing body of the 
which as a vanishing term can only 
be evoked by its wreckage as 
Inaudible horn and 
torn sails 
Trailing Hair 
Fragment shores up 





A similar attempt may be made of Beckett’s “neither”: 
 
to and fro in shadow from inner to outershadow 
from impenetrable self to impenetrable unself by way of neither 
as between two lit refuges whose doors once neared gently close, 
once turned away from gently part again 
beckoned back and forth and turned away 
heedless of the way, intent on the one gleam or the other 
unheard footfalls only sound 
till at last halt for good, absent for good from self or other 
then no sound 






























Fig. 2 Vanishing in “neither” 
 
What the fragment implies for Badiou’s first operation of negation is in fact the 
punctuative appearance of the fragment as the edge of vanishing. The fragment as the 
last particle of this metonymic chain of vanishing shores up as an inverse trace to the 
naming of the event; it is a trace of the vanishing term, which in its rubble becomes 
the negative imprint of the event (that is, the abolished of the abolishing). However, 
unlike the original trace of the event (the foam/ the footfalls), the fragment as inverse-
trace does not aim to name the vanishing, but rather, “pare the supposed body back to 
Unheard footfalls 
as the trace of movement 
between 
inner to outershadow impenetrable self to 
impenetrable unself 
two lit refuges 
which as an event already 
abolished, can only be implied 
by the vanishing distance 
between 
which as a vanishing term can 
only be evoked by its wreckage 
as 
sound gleam 
Fragment shores up 




the edges of inexistence” (51). The fragment as the edge of vanishing takes the 
movement of a shredding or trimming, which in its enacted temporality asserts a 
punctuative instantaneity to the regressive temporality of the event understood in its 
disappearance. This movement of the fragment, that which I have termed 
fragmenting, brings us to the second form of negation, cancelling, which acts upon the 
vanishing subtraction of the event. 
 
Second Subtractive Operation: Cancelling as Fragmenting 
Cancelling is a subtraction from subtraction because it suspends vanishing. As 
the second subtractive operation, it acts upon the abolishment of the first in 
necessitating the eventual undecidability of the event: 
The introduction of the siren in fact presumes a second 
negation that is not of the same type as the first. . . .The 
first subtraction figures the vanishing of the supposed 
eventual term under the foam that re-traces it. The 
second cancels out this vanishing itself. And, on the 
basis of this cancelling-out, the second and final 
vanishing term (the siren) springs up. (52) 
 
Cancelling is therefore a doubled subtraction: it acts upon the disappearance of the 
first vanishing term and in doing so, revokes the first supposed name and establishes 
the poem in its “eventual character” (53). This establishing is what Badiou terms “the 
donation of the event with its undecidability” that “for the time a disappearing takes, 
came to supplement the atony of place” (53). As mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
the term “undecidability” must not be understood in a trivial way of our being 
presented with two hypotheses or vanishings in Mallarmé’s poem, but rather, as the 
mark of scission that cancelling entails towards the first hypothesis. In other words, 
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“undecidability” is not a state of indecision, but a mark of decision that is performed 
through the process of indecision as vanishing. This performing through is 
fragmenting. The fragment as wreckage of the word through vanishing undergoes 
fragmenting, which in its enacted temporality stated above, supplements for and 
above the regressive temporality (its atony) of disappearance. Read in this way, 
cancelling is in fact a temporal reconfiguration of vanishing --- the vanishing terms 
are grasped consecutively in the temporal order of reading the poem, rather than 
simultaneously as two vanishing terms in the discursive space after reading. One can 
therefore supplement the diagram of vanishing/fragment with cancelling/fragmenting 



































Fig. 3 Vanishing and Cancelling in “Hushed to the Crushing Cloud” (“A La Nue 
Accablante Tu”) 
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The dotted line is the trace of fragmenting; fragmenting moves the abolished fragment 
(the fragment-that-was-there) under the suspension of vanishing and into the failure of 
the ship as having-taken-place, while at the same time constituting the basis for the 
second vanishing term to spring up through this radical lack of disappearance. The 
“while at the same time” is the mark of scission that marks the undecidability of the 
event. Since the undecidability of the event is the “event character of the event” and 
the “donation of the event” (53) of the poem, the dotted line is the process of 
fragmenting that traces the movement of the thought event of the poem. The scission 
of cancelling donates the undecidability of the event, but the movement of 
fragmenting donates the temporality of thinking the event.  
 But this temporality of thinking the event is negated in “neither” because the 
movement of fragmenting does not lead to the re-establishment of the secondary 
event. Instead, in failing to re-establish both events superfluously indicated at the start 
of the prose (the movement of shadow and self), fragmenting leads us to an eventual 
non-event: “unspeakable home”. This is a non-event because it takes the character of 
the “unheeded neither” which is a stagnation both in space and movement. To be 
precise, the character of “neither” is founded on a doubled negation that cannot even 
be reconciled as stasis. It is an interval of the “not-either” that confounds the failure of 
movement into blankness. It is not about the nothing, but rather in its character as the 
unheeded “not-either” ---- and here we have negation superimposed on a doubled 
negation --- it is the nothing. “neither” is situated at the site of Badiou’s black-grey 
which is an “un-contrasted black” unable to form a dialectical or binary relationship 
of any degree with another element: 
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What is the black-grey? It is a black that no light can be 
supposed to contrast with; it is an un-contrasted black. 
This black is sufficiently grey that no light can be 
opposed to it as its Other. Abstractly, the site of being 
is fictioned as a black-grey enough to be anti-
dialectical, distinct from every contradiction with the 
light. The black-grey is a black that has to be taken in 
its own disposition and that forms no pair with 
anything else.  (“Generic” 256) 
 
Badiou goes on to assert that this site of the black-grey is one that merges the “black 
of wandering” and the “black of motionless” (256) through which being can be 
understood as a presence “at once distributed inside and outside, but its chosen place 
is doubtless rather the “between”, “the interval” (258). Applied back to “neither” and 
into the schema of Badiou’s poetics of subtraction, the black-grey emerges from the 
scission of cancelling not only through the suspension of the vanishing term (the lit 
refuges), but also through the suspension of the interval between both supposed 
events (the movement in shadow and self). The springing up of the supposed eventual 
character/event (unheeded neither/unspeakable home) is hosted precisely in the 
movement of this dual-suspension; the event is not the destination of fragmenting but 
the precise movement of fragmenting. According to the schema of subtraction, the 
dotted line which was the process of fragmenting and the thought event of the prose, 
is now the event itself ----- the event is the fragmenting which donates the temporality 


























Fig. 4 Vanishing and Cancelling in “neither” 
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interval between two events 
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The movement of fragmenting folds back upon the opening events of “neither” and 
suspends the interval between them. This movement as temporal trace of the prose 
enacts the position of “neither” ---- it merges the enclosed and the open by suspending 
vanishing while at the same time re-establishing presence as that which lingers in the 
interval of the black-grey. Since the interval of the black-grey “can be called the 
nothing, or the void, and that has no other name” (“Generic” 257), presence is thus 
withdrawn into the unnameable “unspeakable home” where it is unable to vanish 
precisely because it is founded on this unnameable lack. While the movement of 
fragmenting has given us the temporality of thinking the event --- and inversely, the 
event as the temporality of thinking “neither” through fragmenting --- it is this 
“unspeakable home” as fragmented that presents the “halting point” of foreclosure 
(“Mallarmé” 57) from which the schemas of rupture act upon to enable the flight of 
the fragment. 
 
Third Subtractive Operation: Foreclosure as Fragmented 
 What is the “halting point” of foreclosure? When a term has the attributes of a 
vanishing term except that it cannot be substituted by a second vanishing term, it is 
deemed “unsubstitutable” (56) and is seen as performing “foreclosure” (56). The 
halting point of this last subtractive operation in Mallarmé’s poetry is constituted in 
its pointing to the zone of the “unnameable” (57) where the ability for a trace to return 





If the primitive terms (foam, mirror) are the stakes of 
marking the event, of designating its site; if the first 
vanishing terms (ship, nymph) effectuate this marking 
itself in subtractive fashion; if, finally, the terms 
issuing from cancellation (siren, constellation) point to 
undecidability, and launch victorious thinking (i.e., 
truth), then the terms in foreclosure comprise a halting 
point; they exhibit, in the place as absence to self, a 
zone that is that of the unnameable.” (56 - 57) 
 
A term that performs foreclosure is therefore one that is unable to vanish because it is 
not an echo of anything or any place ---- “all they do is lack” (56). They fail to trace 
anything and are thus unaffected by cancellation as they are incapacitated to recall the 
event. The foreclosed term thus castrates fragmenting into fragmented. In Mallarmé’s 
poetry, Badiou demonstrates that the foreclosed terms declare the unnameable as 
subject, death or language (58), but in “neither”, I propose that this unnameable, 
which occupies the space of the fragmented, takes the contour of flight. It is through 
“unspeakable home” as fragmented that the thought-event of the prose ---- which was 
enacted through the temporality of fragmenting --- is evacuated from its familial 































Fig. 5 Vanishing, Cancelling and Foreclosure in “neither” 
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The evacuation and undo-ing of relational illusion, as indicated above by the doubled 
dotted arrows, are part of the schema of rupture mentioned at the start of this chapter: 
isolation. As the “supreme operation of Mallarmean poetics” (60), isolation enables 
the “fragment of candour” (61) to escape through the site of the fragmented as pure 
flight. This is the eternity of “neither” --- that presence is recollected from the 
remainder (fragment), achieves its temporality in time (fragmenting), but escapes 
through space (fragmented) as flight (fragment of eternity). Fragment resuscitates 
fragment; eternity is founded on the chiasm of the fragment that marks time in 
“neither” but allows the event of the prose to escape. “Where philosophy ends, poetry 
must begin,” Schlegel had declared in Ideen 48. “Unspeakable home” is precisely the 
site of this termination and beginning. The conjunction of philosophy and poetry 
occurs in this site of wandering and stasis where what ends and begins only does so in 
the silence of flight. In its breaking away from all that is familiar and familial, flight 
liberates that fragment of candour as Idea: this is a truth that in Badiou’s terms is 
initiated by the disappearance of the event and is therefore multiple and can only be 
imperfectly named. The poem as a duty and form of thought has brought us the event 
through thought, to the end of thought and now liberates thought as truth. 
 
Schema of Rupture: Isolation 
 This argument demands clarification. First, how does isolation set in upon the 
foreclosed term “unspeakable home” and enable flight from the site of the 
fragmented? Second, what is flight and why is it a fragment of eternity? And third, if 
the chiasm of the fragment is that which enables flight in Beckett’s “neither”, how 
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might one re-incorporate it as a theoretical element back into Badiou’s poetics of 
subtraction?  
 When isolation is implemented alongside the major subtractive operations of 
vanishing, cancelling and foreclosure, it succeeds in bringing forth “a contour of 
nothingness that extirpates the given from any nearness to that which it is not, from all 
relations of proximity” (60). This extirpation thus isolates the “fragment of candour” 
(61) which yields the Idea. The operations of this extirpation can only be inferred 
from Badiou’s analysis of Mallarmé’s Prose (for des Esseintes), which he proceeds 
by delineating five punctuations from which the schemas of rupture act. Isolation sets 
in from the third, and most noticeably in the fourth and fifth, where the notion of the 
multiple is evoked. According to Badiou, the infinite belies a multiple that is “not a 
Whole, has no relation and no representable structure” and is “subtracted from all 
measure and comparison” (65). This “lacunary multiple” is “un-linked in its very 
composition” and presents the space of an inexistent where the “word rescues pure 
being for always” (66 - 67). This can be seen in Prose (for des Esseintes) in the 
following manner: the multiple is contextualized by an image of the flowered island, 
wherein its constituent flowers are revealed to be isolated both in light and 
nothingness, and thus the multiple is conceived to be “un-linked in its very 
composition” (66). The flowers through isolation become “foreign to every totality” 
and in constituting “the sight of an untotalizable concept”, symbolize the infinity of 
the idea which bears no relation or quantification (66). The site of the ideal multiple is 
further subtracted from all known existence through knowledge as it “does not even 
have an indexed name”, which makes it the locus of the inexistent. It is in this 
inexistent that the utterance of the letter --- “Anatasia” in Prose (for des Esseintes), 
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which is “resurrection” --- resuscitates pure being for eternity and removes the 
“implicit threat of death” (67).  
A similar attempt can be made of “neither”, except that the temporality of 
isolation is regressive rather than progressive as observed in Prose (for des Esseintes). 
Unlike in Mallarmé’s poem where the image of the ideal multiple is offered mid-way 
through the poem and subsequently un-linked and isolated to the point of revealing 
the infinite, “neither” offers the image of the ideal multiple only at the end of the 
poem, and performs the operation of isolation be inverting back upon the poem. The 
image of “unspeakable home” in its doubled negation as the uncontrasted black-grey 
and the unutterable void is the site of the fragmented as ideal multiple; this site, which 
“can be called the nothing, or the void, and that has no other name” (“Generic” 257), 
likewise follows the subtraction in Mallarmé’s example of not even having an indexed 
name. Instead of enabling an utterance in this inexistent --- “anatasia” as the word of 
flight ---, the chiasm of the fragment in “neither” enables the flight of word. The 
fragmented escapes as flight by evacuating itself from the context of its utterance 
(“two lit refuges”) and  un-tracing itself from its original utterance (“unheard 
footfalls”). This inversion of the letter back upon the poem occurs because of the logic 
of the fragment as chiasm: fragment resuscitates fragment; flight resuscitates footfalls 
because the flight is fragment. The flight is a mere fragment of eternity: it recollects 
rather than realizes eternity. This is because the fragment of candour, to recall Badiou, 
opens to eternity, but through the poetics of subtraction and isolation has kept eternity 




Truth and Undecidability 
This brings us to the second question: what is flight and why is it a fragment 
of eternity? What does it mean to recollect eternity at a distance, rather than to realize 
it? The clarification at this point is between truth and undecidability. According to 
Badiou, it is through the operations of exception that eternity is won and born through 
the word in Mallarmé’s poetry (Mallarmé 67), but this eternity is only borne through 
the scission of undecidability which remains undecided. This is why eternity is kept at 
a distance; the poetics of Mallarmé’s exception, in contrast to Rimbaud’s (which will 
be tackled in Chapter 4), is one of patience where the poem yields the Idea yet 
preserves the restraint of undecidability: 
 Both discovered the origin of the poem in the 
visitation of a having-taken-place heterogeneous to the 
opaque and voiceless spread of being. But Mallarmé’s 
chief purpose was to declare, using a schema not of 
interruption but of exception, that unremitting thought 
keeps eternity at a distance. It may well be that nothing 
takes place but the place, other than that the 
undecidable of the dice-throw brings forth a 
Constellation. (Rimbaud 87) 
 
 
Badiou goes on to assert that the undecidable in Mallarmé is left undecided, a 
testament to his claim that “[t]o love poetry is to love not being able to choose” 
(Rimbaud 88). This is in contrast to Rimbaud, who upon catching a glimpse of 
eternity, impatiently terminated its vision in favour of the “instantaneous diffusion of 





Mallarmé, for his part, upheld that it is as a patient 
singularity that a truth will turn out to be veridical, in 
the isolation of its procedure, without its ever fusing 
with the situation in which it insists. The province of 
poetry is a restrained action, one that changes thought, 
and leaves undecided an undecidability that 
metaphorizes that of the event, no matter the extent to 
which it affects situated being. (88) 
 
 
It is thus as a fragment of candour that truth escapes in the form of an Idea  --- the 
purity of Being, the ideal multiple without Whole ---- for the scrolls of eternity, which 
is the presence of the present, time itself, the always of time, the infinite (“Rimbaud” 
78). But the undecidability of the poem calls back the patience of poetry and the 
reticence of the word. Fragment resuscitates fragment; it is as flight that the Idea of 
the poem escapes towards eternity, but this eternity in being a destination of a 
fragmenting derived from undecidability recalls the fragment of the letter.   Thus, time 
in “neither” both escapes as flight and relapses upon the original letter: in both a 
fragment towards a generation of eternity. This is perhaps what is meant when Badiou 
writes that truth “founds a time, and yet is eternal” (“Rimbaud” 85). The “contour of 
nothingness” that isolation yields is empty, but empty because eternal. 
 That time escapes and relapses in “neither” through the structure of the 
fragment does not mean that time is circular. This is because flight and exception are 
not recursive, rather, they are chiasmic. The temporal structure of the fragment is a 
chiasm. Here I propose that Beckett’s “neither” subsists upon Badiou’s subtractive 
machine a poetics of time that is chiasmic, and it is as temporal marker that the 
chiasmic structure of the fragment can be re-incorporated into Badiou’s subtractive 
machinery. The logic of the chiasm in relation to the fragment must be understood 
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Chapter 3  Chiasm of the Fragment 
In a sense the whole of philosophy, as Husserl says, 
consists in restoring a power to signify, a birth of 
meaning, or a wild meaning, an expression of 
experience by experience, which in particular clarifies 
the special domain of language. And in a sense, as 
Valéry said, language is everything, since it is the voice 
of no one, since it is the voice of the things, the waves, 
and the forests. And what we have to understand is that 
there is no dialectical reversal from one of these views 
to the other; we do not have to reassemble them into a 
synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility 
which is the ultimate truth.  
 
--- Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining --- The Chiasm” 
 
 
 It is a puzzling affair to read Merleau-Ponty’s “The Intertwining --- The 
Chiasm”. Written as the fourth chapter of his last book, The Visible and The Invisible, 
the word “chiasm” is mentioned only in its title and nowhere in the rest of the chapter. 
Like Beckett’s missing word in “neither”, the reader ponders if s/he is the missing 
link akin to that invisible hinge of the chiasm that because it is the catch of the chiasm 
will not see the chiasm. It is with an equally puzzling distinction between “dialectic 
reversal” and “aspects of the reversibility” that Merleau-Ponty ends this chapter as 
seen in the above quotation. How are “aspects” of a reversibility, imminently distinct 
from each other, able to generate an “ultimate truth” without dialectical reversal and 
synthesis? The key to this understanding is revealed in a juxtaposition of the chapter 
with the lengthy and fragmented “Working Notes” to the chapter that Merleau-Ponty 
had left behind: reversibility entails a reversal that is caught up in its reversing. Here 
we have a concept that gathers movement as stagnation through which truth emerges. 
With this starting point, it becomes evident that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the 
chiasm --- its intertwining and its reversibility --- has intricate relevance to the 
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structure of the fragment as temporal marker in Beckett’s “neither”. As proposed 
towards the end of the previous chapter, the fragment is a temporal particle that 
subsists on and regenerates the subtractive machine in the process of reading. The 
hinge of the “and” is the logic of the chiasm. It is through the logic of Merleau-
Ponty’s chiasm that the fragment as flight is incorporated into Badiou’s schema of 
subtraction. 
 This chapter will proceed by way of two fundamental operations.  First, the 
concept and dynamics of Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm will be delineated according to his 
chapter “The Intertwining --- The Chiasm” with crucial attention paid to his ideas on 
time as chiasm in the “Working Notes”. Second, I will exemplify the movement of the 
fragment as understood through Badiou’s subtractive machine as chiasmic in 
structure. The incorporation of Merleau-Ponty into Badiou and onto Beckett will 
enable one to see how the fragment as temporal marker in “neither”, and subsequently 
in “one dead of night”, enables flight from the letter. 
 
Chiasm as Relationship 
 At its most fundamental level, the chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s theory is the 
structure of a relationship between specific phenomenological elements in the lived 
life. This structure is not linear. Since the word “chiasm” is commonly understood as 
an x-shape or crisscross pattern, or in grammar as an inversion of parallel phrases, the 
chiasmic structure in Merleau-Ponty involves overlapping, intertwining and inversion 
of the elements at play. Instances of this overlapping or reversing relationship are 
between one’s vision and the external visibility, and one’s touching and the external 
tangible. This is because one is never fully seeing as much as one is seen, and 
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likewise, one is integral to the tangible --- is a tangible --- as much as one can touch 
the tangible. This chiasmic relationship between different elements in the lived life 
results in the experience of the life itself as chiasmic in its totality. The “one” that is 
central to the vision and the touching becomes coalesced with the external world in 
which the visibility and the tangible exists, resulting in the “one” becoming part of the 
external and vice-versa. Simultaneously, the vision and the visible become inscribed 
in the touching and the tangible, and vice-versa, resulting not only in an inter-
inversion between the sensible and the sensed, but also an intra-inversion of sorts 
within the sensible and the sensed. The beauty of Merleau-Ponty’s theory is that there 
is a logic to this mesh of inter and intra-inversions, and this logic, which is the logic 
of the chiasm, belies a circulation of expression which emerges through the 
transitivity of the flesh: 
 
There is a circle of the touched and the touching, the 
touched takes hold of the touching: there is a circle of 
the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without 
visible existence; there is even an inscription of the 
touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible --- 
and the converse; there is finally a propagation of these 
exchanges to all bodies of the same type and of the 
same style which I see and touch --- and this by virtue 
of the fundamental fission or segregation of the sentient 
and the sensible which, laterally, makes the organs of 
my body communicate and founds transitivity from one 
body to another. (143) 
  
What is the transitivity of the flesh? First, one has to understand that what Merleau-
Ponty refers to as flesh is not corporeal matter, but the texture of the relationship 
between the body and the world. Because this texture is one that “returns to itself and 
conforms to itself” (146), and is marked in particular by a coiling over of the visible 
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and the tangibles over the body, the flesh is therefore one that envelops the body into 
the exterior and vice-versa, making it an “interiorly worked-over mass” (147). It is 
therefore an element of being rather than a substance of the body, and it becomes the 
“formative medium of the object and the subject” (147). As formative medium, it thus 
extends beyond the singular subject and object to encompass the co-relating textures 
of relationships between other bodies upon the flesh of the world: 
 
For the first time, the body no longer couples itself up 
with the world, it clasps another body, applying [itself 
to it] carefully with its whole extension . . . the body is 
lost outside of the world and its goals, fascinated by the 
unique occupation of floating in Being with another 
life, of making itself the outside of its inside and the 
inside of its outside. And henceforth movement, touch, 
vision, applying themselves to the other and to 
themselves, return toward their source and, in the 




The transitivity of the flesh thus entails the logic of its reversibility upon the flesh of 
the world, which encompasses not only the tangible and visible external, but also the 
inflection of other sentient bodies of touching and seeing. Expression emanated is 
thus expression echoed. The paradox of expression that Merleau-Ponty mentions here 
is the crux of its reversibility, wherein expression is founded on the coupling of its 








There is vision, touch, when a certain visible, a certain 
tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the 
whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when 
suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when 
between it and them, and through their commerce, is 
formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong 
properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world 
qua fact --- as upon two mirrors facing one another 
where two indefinite series of images set in one another 
arise which belong really to neither of the two surfaces, 
since each is only the rejoinder of the other, and which 
therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either 
of them. (139) 
 
 
This coupling involves not only an encrusting of one into the other but a reflection of 
one as the other. This reflection further reveals an inflexion of one upon the other, 
wherein the relationship as chiasm between the two aspects entails that none of the 
aspects ever existed as part without the whole. This whole, intriguingly, is an image 
of movement, which the last chapter will pick up in conclusion. For now, we return to 
the start of this chapter, where the distinction between “dialectic reversal” and 
“aspects of reversibility” can be made through an understanding of reversibility not as 
the recursiveness of flesh, but the constant inflexion of flesh, within flesh, as flesh. In 
fact, Merleau-Ponty makes a startling point towards the end of the chapter about the 
non-recursiveness of reversibility wherein aspects of the reversibility escape from 
each other, and in escaping reinstates the totality of the being, the Whole, and 
subsequently the idea. Reversibility is thus “always imminent and never realized in 
fact” (148) because the silent hinge that realizes reversibility will always be hidden 
from the human subject that precisely sustains the movement of the chiasm with his 
blindedness. This blindedness is not a failure to see, but is rather a testament to the 
blank of human perception that suspends the discursive for the simultaneous: 
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My left hand is always on the verge of touching my 
right hand touching the things, but I never reach 
coincidence; the coincidence eclipses at the moment of 
realization. . . . But this incessant escaping . . . --- this 
is not a failure. For if these experiences never exactly 
overlap, if they slip away at the very moment they are 
about to rejoin . . . this is precisely because my two 
hands are part of the same body, because it moves itself 
in the world, because I hear myself both from within 
and without. I experience --- and as often as I wish --- 
the transition and the metamorphosis of the one 
experience into the other, and it is only as though the 
hinge between them, solid, unshakeable, remained 
irremediably hidden from me. (148) 
 
The aspects of the reversibility thus escape from each other in the hiatus where 
recursivity would have been established. This is a concept of reversibility without 
recursivity: there is an interlocking and intertwining of the two aspects irremediably 
founded and reflected in the other, but the experience of each aspect remains non-
interchangeable and non-sequential. The structure of the chiasm is therefore one of 
temporal movement in thought, but of atemporal sequentiality when experienced at 
the locus of the Whole. What is eclipsed at the hinge of transition is the deference of 
thought from the Whole. The Idea because infinite escapes from the temporal 
sequentiality and simultaneity of the lived life: it is imminent in space and immanent 
through thought, and here I propose, accomplished through time. The hinge that 
“remained irremediably hidden” is the node of time in the “woof of the simultaneous 
and the successive” (132). This is the temporality of the fragment that, as discussed 
through Badiou in the previous chapter, lends itself to a fragment of eternity through 
flight --- the always of time --- and yet resuscitates the fragment of subtraction, which 




Chiasm as Time 
In order to propose that the node of time is the hinge that operates between 
reversibility and recursivity, one has to first delineate the trace of time as it moves 
through Merleau-Ponty’s explication of the chiasm, eventually becoming the chiasm 
itself. When observed carefully, the structure of the chiasm is one that is built upon 
successive negation and simultaneous subtraction of concurrent images and 
movements that belie the texture of time. The primary structure of the chiasm consists 
of two parts, each complete by itself and yet dependently constitutive of the other:  
 
It is as though our vision were formed in the heart of 
the visible, or as though there were between it and us 
an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand. 
And yet it is not possible that we blend into it, nor that 
it passes into us, for then the vision would vanish at the 
moment of formation, by the disappearance of the seer 
or of the visible. What there is then are not things first 
identical with themselves, which would then offer 
themselves to the seer . . . --- but something to which 
we could not be closer than by palpating it with our 
look . . . because the gaze itself envelops them, clothes 
them with its own flesh. (130 – 131) 
 
Vision is therefore not simply a part of the larger visible because the visible is itself 
formed by vision, even as it is not dissolved into vision. This structure is then 
developed by way of intersecting movements of the parts, wherein the movement 
itself becomes an element of the chiasmic structure. By extrapolating the chiasmic 
structure between the visible and vision quoted above to the tangible and touching, 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that the structure of the chiasm is not only a complication of 
part and whole, but rather a temporal situating of the mutual derivation of each part 




[ . . .] [T]here must exist some relationship by 
principle, some kinship, according to which they are 
not only . . .vague and ephemeral deformations of the 
corporeal space, but the initiation to and the opening 
upon a tactile world. . .Through the crisscrossing 
within it of the touching and the tangible, its own 
movements incorporate themselves into the universe 
they interrogate, are recorded on the same map as it is; 
two systems are applied upon one another, as the two 
halves of an orange. (133) 
 
This temporal situating of mutual derivation is the crisscrossing of the two parts 
which opens up and incorporates each into the other. The structure of the chiasm 
moves from noun to verb: the moment of intertwining is what gives the part its whole 
and vice-versa. But Merleau-Ponty goes further to suggest that this intertwining is 
doubled when the visible and the tangible intersect, creating a “double and crossed 
situating of the visible in the tangible and of the tangible in the visible” (134). Just as 
vision was primarily proposed to be at the heart of the visible, every visible is 
likewise encrusted in the tangible, each constitutive of the other in generating the 
same experienced world. What we have here is therefore a chiasmic structure between 
the body sensed and the body sensing, wherein the body sensed is itself encroached in 
another chiasm within the tangible and the visible. Merleau-Ponty gives this doubled 
chiasmic strand the image of a body with two leaves according to the dual orders of 
“object” and “subject”, which he goes on to negate a few lines down in a 







One should not even say, as we did a moment ago, that 
the body is made up of two leaves, of which the one, 
that of the “sensible,” is bound up with the rest of the 
world. There are not in it two leaves or two layers; 
fundamentally it is neither thing seen only nor seer 
only, it is Visibility sometimes wandering and 
sometimes reassembled. (137 – 138) 
 
 
It becomes clear at this juncture that the chiasm is a part-whole relationship in 
movement; the relationship is the movement. This movement is reciprocal and inter-
dependent, but in its generation and re-generation of the whole, its sometimes 
wandering and sometimes reassembled (and here it uncannily superimposes with 
Badiou’s site of the black-grey --- the “black of wandering” and the “black of 
motionless”), the movement is undefined in its origin and destination and is therefore 
a form of atemporal time: 
 
To speak of leaves or of layers is still to flatten and to 
juxtapose, under the reflective gaze, what coexists in 
the living and upright body. If one wants metaphors, it 
would be better to say that the body sensed and the 
body sentient are as the obverse and the reverse, or 
again, as two segments of one sole circular course 
which goes above from left to right and below from 
right to left, but which is but one sole movement in its 
two phases. (138) 
 
This atemporal circular course is further complicated by its positioning upon and 







My body as a visible thing is contained within the full 
spectacle. But my seeing body subtends this visible 
body, and all the visible with it. There is reciprocal 
insertion and intertwining of one in the other. Or rather 
. . . there are two circles, or two vortexes, or two 
spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon as 
I question myself, the one slightly decentred with 
respect to the other. . . . (138) 
 
Here we return to the paradox of expression earlier mentioned, and it becomes clear 
that this paradox is, in fact, temporal in nature for it concerns the tension between 
simultaneity and reversibility, and by congruency, subjective time and atemporal time. 
The chiasm is one that is primarily temporal in texture and structure. Merleau-Ponty 
makes this very clear in the fragments of his “Working Notes”, first by presenting the 
paradox in time between the past and present, then showing how this paradox can be 
overcome in thought through the concept of the chiasm:  
 
Time must constitute itself --- be always seen from the 
point of view of someone who is of it./ But this seems 
contradictory, and would lead back to one of the two 
terms of the preceding alternative./ The contradiction is 
lifted only if the new present is itself a transcendent: 
one knows that it is not there, that it was just there, one 
never coincides with it --- It is not a segment of time 
with defined contours that would come and set itself in 
place. It is a cycle defined by a central and dominant 
region and with indecisive contours --- a swelling or 
bulb of time (184) 
 
 
Here we have an understanding of the chiasm as a bulb of time. This bulb harbours in 
it both the cycle of reversibility and the swellings of simultaneity, and the turning 
point at which the both meet is the crux of the chiasm. This turning point of time, 
which is the intersection of the “X” and the achievement of the chiasm, is what 
61 
 
Merleau-Ponty reinforces as the meeting of perception with counter-perception that 
validates the negative: 
The only “place” where the negative would really be is 
the fold, the application of the inside and the outside to 
one another, the turning point --- (264) 
The chiasm, reversibility, is the idea that every 
perception is doubled with a counter-perception 
(Kant’s real opposition), is an act with two faces, one 
no longer knows who speaks and who listens. (264 – 
265)  
 
The intersection, hinge, turning-point or “fold” of the chiasm thus applies the aspects 
of reversibility onto one another without dialectical reversal. In its rejoining or 
coupling with the image of its double, each element defers the origin or destination of 
its reversal for the movement of the reversal in its totality.  It is from this point that 
Merleau-Ponty extends his structure of the chiasm from time, to perception, and 
finally to flesh: 
. . . the idea of chiasm, that is: every relation with being 
is simultaneously a taking and a being taken, the hold is 
held, it is inscribed and inscribed in the same being that 
it takes hold of. (266) 
Then past and present are Ineinander, each enveloping-
enveloped --- and that itself is the flesh (268) 
 
Flesh can now be fully appreciated on retrospect as the culmination of the chiasm of 
time. As an element and fragment of being (139), flesh is founded on the inter-locking 
movement and re-constitution of the past and the present as reversibility of time. 
“Worked-over-matter-men = chiasm” (275), this is the final word that Merleau-Ponty 
leaves us in his “Working Notes”, and now that we have understood the basis of the 
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chiasm as time, we will have to turn to the relation between the chiasm and the idea --
- that very last dash between matter and men in the equation. 
 
Intuitus Mentis: Thought as Flesh, Method, Duty   
 The relationship between chiasm and the idea first appears in its premature 
form as that between chiasm and thought towards the end of the main text. Following 
the mention of “the paradox of expression” (144), which we have thus far understood 
as a primary paradox of time, Merleau-Ponty goes on to introduce speech and thought 
into the structure of the chiasm: 
This new reversibility and the emergence of the flesh 
as expression are the point of insertion of speaking and 
thinking in the world of silence.  
At the frontier of the mute or solipsist world . . . we 
reach a second or figurative meaning of vision, which 
will be the intuitus mentis or idea, a sublimation of the 
flesh, which will be mind or thought. But the factual 
presence of other bodies could not produce thought or 
the idea if its seed were not in my own body. Thought 
is a relationship with oneself and with the world as well 
as a relationship with the other; hence it is established 
in the three dimensions at the same time. (144 - 145) 
 
The idea is understood in the primary conjecture as the sublimation of flesh, and by 
virtue of its three-dimensionality --- its inversion of the self upon the world which is 
the conjunction and constitution of other selves in this mirage of reversibilities --- 
thought takes on the movement of the chiasm, the Ineinander of time. But more than 
that: upon careful reading, Merleau-Ponty sees the idea not as an extension of the 
chiasm, nor yet another layer of the chiasm, but the culmination of the chiasm at its 
turning-point. The turning-point of the chiasm attains precision within perception as 
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the idea, intuitus mentis, and the idea is that which manifests yet inscribes flesh within 
perception and speech: 
As there is a reversibility of the seeing and the visible, 
and as at the point where the two metamorphoses cross 
what we call perception is born, so also there is a 
reversibility of the speech and what it signifies; the 
signification is what comes to seal, to close, to gather 
up the multiplicity of the physical, physiological, 
linguistic means of elocution, to contract them into one 
sole act, as the vision comes to complete the 
aesthesiological body. (154) 
 
 The idea envoices the mute and the solipsist by virtue of its perfect exemplification of 
the visible and invisible at the hinge of the chiasm. This crossing over of the two 
metamorphoses is that which not only inscribes each aspect of reversibility in the 
other, but also sustains each as the other. The sole locus of perception, intuitus mentis, 
turns the flesh inside out in establishing the concurrent speech and silence of the idea:  
When the silent vision falls into speech, and when the 
speech in turn, opening up a field of the nameable and 
the sayable, inscribes itself in that field, in its place, 
according to its truth --- in short, when it 
metamorphoses the structures of the visible world and 
makes itself a gaze of the mind, intuitus mentis --- this 
is always in virtue of the same fundamental 
phenomenon of reversibility which sustains both the 
mute perception and the speech and which  manifests 
itself by an almost carnal existence of the idea, as well 
as by a sublimation of the flesh. (154 - 155) 
 
The idea because infinite accomplishes yet escapes the bulb of time as the flesh of 
thought. With this understanding, we are now able to understand the opening 
quotation of this chapter: 
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 And what we have to understand is that there is no 
dialectical reversal from one of these views to the 
other; we do not have to reassemble them into a 
synthesis: they are two aspects of the reversibility 
which is the ultimate truth. (155) 
 
 
The ultimate truth is carried by the idea which accomplishes the chiasm in time. If the 
idea is the sublimation of flesh, then the truth of the chiasm carries in it, at its turning-
point, the fragment of being (139). This fragment would seek its reflection, its echo, 
and its double in Badiou’s fragment of candour that escapes the familial in the 
circulation of exception in Mallarmé’s contour of nothingness, and as we will see in 
the next chapter, through interruption in the contour of ruin in Rimbaud. The fragment 
of candour, to reinstate, is nothing but truth. Like Merleau-Ponty, the nature of this 
truth emerges from and is sustained by a point between the movement of two aspects 
of a composition. For Merleau-Ponty, this is the turning-point between simultaneity 
and reversibility, and for Badiou this is the scission of the undecidability of the event 
which the poem donates as thought-event. It is this scission that enables the 
movement of the fragment towards truth --- from fragmenting to fragmented --- in 
Mallarmé’s schema of exception that we have seen in the previous chapter. In 
escaping as this fragment of candour, truth resuscitates poetry as the fragment of 
word: this is because fragment resuscitates fragment, simultaneity reverses into 
reversibility, atemporal time recourses into subjective time, and finally, eternity 
recapitulates the present as the “always of time”. The poem regenerates itself but 
enables the flight of the fragment; no, not “but”, but precisely because it enables this 
flight. This is the logic and the beauty of the chiasm, and between Badiou and 
Merleau-Ponty we have found a poetics of the fragment in Beckett that embodies 
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method and ethics. And here “embodies” is used in no trivial way: the fragment 
reveals thought to be method and duty through the poem, but only at the locus of the 
crossing over of the mute and speaking body. At the turning point of the chiasm is the 
flight of the Idea that trespasses flesh as thought as truth. 
 
Fragment as Method and Ethics of Transposition 
 This poetics of fragment is a method of transposition where the idea comes to 
pass through the operations of the poem in a temporal movement that we now 
understand as chiasmic. Transposition: this is what Mallarmé deems the “passing of 
thought that is immanent to the poem”, and which Badiou claims produces an Idea 
(Inaesthetics 30). Since the poem is a space for the passing of thought (30), and this 
passing through as artistic procedure initiates the “differential point of a truth” (12), 
Merleau-Ponty’s structure of the chiasm as time, flesh, and finally intuitus mentis thus 
provides this transposition the hinge between space and truth. The fragment as 
temporal marker is, therefore, that which at once manifests and inscribes the chiasm 
within this truth procedure. This is what enables the flight of the fragment from the 
poem, this fragment which in its circulation becomes an Idea, a flash of eternity, a 
presence that emerges through rupture as a fragment of truth: 
What transposition produces in the midst of language is 
not an object of any sort, but rather an Idea. The poem 
is “a speechless flight [envol tacite] of abstractions.” 
“Flight” designates the perceivable movement of the 
poem; “speechless,” that every subjective chatter has 
been eliminated; “abstraction,” that, in the end, a pure 





The import of Merleau-Ponty into Badiou is the dynamics of this “perceivable 
movement” of the poem as flight. What Badiou perceives, Merleau-Ponty narrates. 
The chiasm as it moves through Merleau-Ponty and Badiou thus becomes the 
narrative hinge between method and ethics in Beckett. This narration takes the form 
of transposition which arranges the operation and liberation of presence in the face of 
disappearance: 
 
Finally, transposition arranges --- between the 
elocutionary disappearance of the poet and the pure 
notion --- the operation itself, the transposition, and the 
meaning, acting independently, in the garb of the 
enigma that beckons them. Or, as Mallarmé says, “The 
buried meaning moves and arranges, into a chorus, 
some sheets.” (Badiou, Inaesthetics 30) 
 
 
For Badiou, this fragment of truth or “buried meaning” is “undecidable, indiscernible, 
unnameable and generic” (Lecercle 214), but emerges from the passage of 
transposition in an artwork through the dissolution and explosion of familiar and 
familial significations. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this fragment of truth 
emerges through the site of “unspeakable home” in “neither” as an Idea evacuated and 
ruptured from its original context and trace. This Idea is a fragment of truth because it 
asserts presence (or what Badiou would reinforce as the purity of Notion) in its flight 
from the poem. The poem enables this flight through a rigorous schema of exception 
which finally enables isolation to set in upon the foreclosed site of “unspeakable 
home”. What this chapter reinforces for this argument is the doubled space of 
“unspeakable home” as the foreclosed site of Badiou’s schema of exception and the 
turning point of Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm. Badiou points us to “unspeakable home” as 
the culmination of a method (exception) to liberate ethics (Idea as fragment of truth), 
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but Merleau-Ponty shows us that this culmination as intuitus mentis is the turning 
point of the chiasm between the silence and the speech of the Idea (method) as 
fundamentally a sublimation of flesh (ethics). The turning point of the chiasm will 
always refer back to the aspects of its reversibility --- the Idea will always refer back 
to the trace of the word --- but as Merleau-Ponty has showed us, this reversibility is 
destined to fail. It is irremediably eclipsed from the locus of the Whole and only 
realized in the node of time. What this thesis proposes in the transposition of these 
ideas is that this node of time is the time of the fragment. The fragment takes place. It 
moves through poetry as a particle of the thought-event, is liberated as Idea as a 
fragment of eternity, and finally falls back upon the original letter as a fragment of 
reversibility. It achieves the Idea and the chiasm in a perfect emblem of its 
incompletion. The fragment trembles in its mortality as time, and as we will see in the 














Chapter 4  Contour of Ruin: “one dead of night”      
je voudrais que mon amour meure           I would like my love to die 
quíl pleuve sur le cimetière            and the rain to be raining on the graveyard 
et les ruelles où je vais            and on me walking the streets 
pleurant celle qui crut m’aimer           mourning her who thought she loved me 
 
 
--- Beckett, “je voudrais que mon amour meure”/  
”I would like my love to die”, 1948 
 
 
Elle est retrouvée     It has been found again. 
Quoi? --- L’éternité     What? --- Eternity. 
C’est la mer allée     It is the sea gone off 
Avec le soleil      With the sun 
 
 
  --- Rimbaud, last stanza of “L’éternité”/”Eternity”, 1872 
 
  
While Beckett is known for having translated Rimbaud’s poetry, the two 
names are rarely aligned in literature, and certainly not in the kind of poetry that they 
write. But in the last rhyming couplet of each of their poems above, they are, if only 
for a slight instant. It is not only the uncanny coincidence of rhyming schemes (vais, 
m’aimer/ allée, soleil) that draws one’s attention, but the movement of retracing a 
fragment of memory that contains that pellicle of emotion. This is, in fact, one of the 
very few revealing poems in Beckett’s oeuvre where love is directly inscribed as 
mark. Thereafter, love, like Mallarmé’s buried meaning, will be moved and arranged 
into a chorus, some sheets. Love for Rimbaud, however, is far from buried. According 






Love is the materiality of salvation. . . . Love is the 
consummate form wherein the promise of being is 
stated . . . Love is the passage of visitation . . . Love is 
what “we, erect in rage and boredom, see pass by in the 
sky of storms and the flags of ecstasy”. 
 
Love bestows the exact state of being within a 
redeemed universe. Of the names Rimbaud assigns to 




This sets the ground for Rimbaud’s schema of interruption. If it is in the name of love 
that eternity is rediscovered, then it is just as immediately lost in the force of 
interruption which establishes a contour of ruin in the space of the poem. This 
interruption is an impatience to “seizing and suspending the undecidable” (87); it is an 
impatience to truth. Unlike Mallamé’s schema of exception which maintains the 
undecidability of the event and thus keeps eternity at a distance, Rimbaud’s schema of 
interruption is fixated with the transfiguration of truth in the Now of time. If 
Mallarmé can be seen as the patient figure of moving the thought-event of the poem 
through the passage of fragmenting, eventually encountering the fragmented and thus 
resuscitating the fragment, then Rimbaud is his impetuous shadow who continuously 
ushers fragment to fragment, leaving the remains of the poem as the contour of the 
fragmented. 
 
Interruption: The Deceit of a Promise not Kept 
 One can understand Rimbaud’s schema of interruption by way of three 
qualities or characteristics that Badiou explicates in the course of his essay. First, a 
poem that exemplifies interruption is one that exhibits a promise but in the course of 
the poem decides that this promise is to be offset or simply not be kept. This 
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imperative is the fracture of interruption that reinforces presence through an abrupt 
departure or withdrawal of the promise: 
 
Thus, at the heart of Rimbaud’s poetry there is a 
protocol, whose effects of abruptness and dissipation 
the artist refined simultaneously, of a crack between 
what being carries of the promise of presence and what, 
in the withdrawal that modifies it, it enforces, in the 
form of a law of return and motionless. (70 – 71)   
 
 
The impatience of interruption is perceived as a crack that, in its withdrawal of 
promise, in turn reasserts presence. However, in its seizing of the Now, this presence 
is thus impurified and lends itself to the second characteristic of interruption: deceit. 
By virtue of deciding against a promise offered, a poem of interruption is one of 
deception and disappointment. Such deceit “turns poetry away from its own clearing” 
(69) and “impurifies presence” (70), while allowing the poem, which is the space of 
thought, to escape from poetry, which is the poeticization of what comes to pass 
(Inaesthetics 29):  
 
By itself, this internal deception, this point of flight in 
which the poem escapes from the poetry of the poem, 
in which it slips away is as though a language 
contaminated by the plague, or as though a transparent 
water that had been caught in some ignoble sluice, 
explains why it is that we, in this centenary more than 
ever, go to seek a consolation for his poems in the 
sandy legend of his life. (“Rimbaud” 68) 
 
The deceit of interruption lends itself to the doubled movement of the poem as flight 
and fracture. This splitting and flight of the poem (the where of thought) from the 
poetry of the poem (the what of thought) is what constitutes the third characteristic of 
a poem of interruption. In the brutal splitting of the poem, interruption presents us 
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with the singular oscillation between two universes from which a thought of the 
undecidable is enacted. This thought is enacted in that instant of oscillation as 
interruption is precisely the “undecidable divide in this seeing” between “two 
incompatible figures of being” (74 – 75): 
 
[. . . ] Rimbaud’s poems are most often devoted to 
interruption itself, to what it is that carries to language 
less the ecstasy of givenness or the unfigurable duty of 
being-there than an instantaneous see-sawing from one 
to the other. What captivated Rimbaud was the enigma 
of this point, and it is to make truth of it, like of a pure 
event for thought, that he had need of the resources of 
poetry. 
 
This is why I would say that what Rimbaud attempted 
in the interruptive operation of the poem was a thought 
of the undecidable. (73) 
 
This point of the undecidable, the halting oscillation between two incompatible 
universes, serves to summon us to “the event that it issues only to interrupt” (83). This 
is an inherent impatience to a truth which fixates the undecidable in an excision of 
distance for the instantaneity of time which appropriates the idea towards evanescent 
desire. If the idea in the schema of exception is gained through the lack of the lack 
(the fragment as trace of an evacuated event) at the scission of undecidability which 
leaves undecidability undecided, then the idea in the schema of interruption is 
exposed through the abrupt imminence of its lack at the oscillation of undecidability 






Rimbaud in essence decided that, and it is here that the 
poem as capture of the undecidable served him 
personally, if truth is not all given in the daybreak of its 
event, if it requires the patience and fidelity of a labour 
. . . then it is better to suppose that it does not exist. . . . 
The interruption in his poems is an impatience applied 
to seizing and suspending the undecidable. That is 
where Rimbaud’s genius lay. But interruption is self-
combusting; interruption is an impatience with this 
impatience, so that ultimately it is what decides. And 
what it decides is that nothing was ever undecidable. 
(86 - 87) 
 
 
This “impatience with this impatience” is what makes Badiou argue that the poetics of 
interruption ultimately “betokens the same mimetic temptation” (89) that obscures it 
from being a procedure of truth. Since Badiou’s project affirms that art is itself 
coextensive with the truth it generates (Inaesthetics 9), Rimbaud’s poetics of 
interruption serves instead to represent the lack of this truth, rather than to manifest 
and work through the lack within the conditions of the poem as in the schema of 
exception. In its grip of impatience on the undecidable, interruption reveals itself to be 
inherently a gesture of doubled impatience in its representation of truth’s own 
impatient absence. This is why Badiou ultimately favours the patient figure of 
Mallarmé over Rimbaud. 
 
Operations of Interruption: Meter, Prose, Image 
 But in order to understand how these three characteristics come to qualify the 
schema of interruption and how they are subsequently observed in “one dead of 
night”, one has to first delineate the methods of this rupture in the context of the 
poem. Badiou suggests three main ways in which interruption acts upon the poem. 
This can be done, firstly, through an abrupt disruption to meter which distends the 
73 
 
order of saying and terminates the promised epiphany before the “muted closure of 
the word” (70) at the juncture of interruption. Such metric instability can sometimes 
lend itself to the second method of interruption wherein prose surfaces from poetry. 
Both methods of interruption can be observed in the first two stanzas of Rimbaud’s 
Brussels poem “Plates-bandes d’amarantes […]”: 
 
Plates-bandes d’amarantes jusqu’à            Flowerbands of amaranths up to 
L’agréable palais de Jupiter.           The delightful palace of Jupiter. 
--- Je sais que cést Toi, qui, dans ces lieux,     --- I know it is You, who, in this place, 
Mêles ton Bleu Presque de Sahara!          Mingle your almost Sahara Blue! 
 
Puis, comme rose et sapin du soleil            Then, as rose and fir-tree of the sun 
Et liane ont ici leurs jeux enclose,            And creeper have their game enclosed here, 
Cage de la petite veuve! . . .              The little widow’s cage! . . .  
   Quelles          What 
Troupes d’oiseaux! o iaio, iaio! . . .             Flocks of birds! o iaio, iaio! . . .  
 
 
Badiou argues that at the heart of this poem is “a prose lying in wait” (71), and this 
prose in store downstream of interruption “impurifies presence” (72).  Because prose 
is a figure of doubt that introduces both instability and flight, it thus disrupts 
movement and breath of the pure presence of poetry (72). This prose in ambush is 
inherent in the above poem through metric instability, which is the first method of 
interruption, that is introduced in the second stanza where the decasyllable “And 
creeper have their game enclosed here” (“Et liane ont ici leurs jeux enclose”) causes the 
poem to veer from the “intrinsic basis” of verse, thereafter leading on to flight by 
disrupting the sensible “held captive to number” (71). In addition, one would observe 
that there is further interruption through the use of “peremptory syntax” (71) such as 
the consecutive “then” (“puis”) and “and” (“et”) in the fifth and sixth lines before the 
caesura of “what” (“quelles”) which reorders the event of the poem in its splitting. In 
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fact, one might even propose that the third method of interruption is evident in this 
poem, even though Badiou uses another poem, “Mémorie”/Memory” to illustrate his 
case. This third method of interruption lies in the instability of image. In the case of 
“Memory”, an unallied flow of colours in an image of pure joy that conjoins noon to 
the mirror of water is brusquely disrupted by the word “conjugal” (“conjugale”), 
through which epiphany is ruptured and prose, once again, threatens to surface. In 
“Plates-bandes d’amarantes […]”, the seventh line “The little widow’s cage! . . .” 
(“Cage de la petite veuve! . . .”) likewise interrupts the timeless movement of the lines 
before, not only through its foreshortening of metre into six syllables (which “Troupes 
d’oiseaux! o iaio, iaio!” will answer in an equally abrupt shift of tri-syllable metre), 
but through the dry instantaneity of “cage” which breaks away from its preceding 
lines both in syntax, sound and image. Like a hollow it swallows the poem from the 
poetry and dissipates the vigour of interruption in establishing a contour of ruin (bord 
de perte) (71). 
 It would be hard to see at first glance how “one dead of night” would be 
Rimabaldian in nature. In truth, it is not; it does not have any of the “but”, or “no”, or 
“then”, which gesture the splitting of interruption. What we take away from Badiou’s 
exposition on Rimbaud is the operation of interruption, which unlike exception, 
denounces rather than defers truth. A similar operation of interruption occurs in “one 
dead of night” wherein the fragment of the poem constantly elides and escapes from 
the movement of poetry through the rupture of interruption. Unlike in “neither” where 
fragment resuscitates fragment in allowing the flight of candour, “one dead of night” 
is an exhibition of being wherein fragment reduces fragment through the imperative 
of interruption which mobilizes impatience in favour of undecidability. In addition to 
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the three operations of interruption which Badiou delineates above --- the instability 
of metre, image and prose-in-wait --- “one dead of night” utilizes repetition, 
substitution and space to enact the rupture of the fragmented. 
 
First Interruptive Operation: Repetition 
Repetition has tremendous interruptive force in “one dead of night” because it 
is a gesture of injunction that creates that instant see-sawing of images as mentioned 
above as the third characteristic of interruption. This oscillation of images, or what 
will later be introduced as Badiou’s concept of figural postures, marks the point of 
undecidability that interruption seizes upon for the Now of time and place. In seizing 
this mark, interruption declares that nothing was undecidable. The most significant 
instance of repetition in “one dead of night” is the line “in the dead still”, which 
occurs in the middle of the poem as a repetition of the second line of the poem. This is 
immediately followed by “till afar”, which is a repetition of the first line of the third 
stanza. In other words, the consecutive repetition of these two lines compresses and 
sheds off the four lines that separated them as they first occurred at the start of the 
poem. What is elided, or more properly, excised, between these two repetitions is the 









one dead of night 
in the dead still 
he looked up 
from his book 
 
from that dark 






in the dead still 
 
till afar 
  his book as by 
  a hand not his 
  a hand on his 
  faintly closed 
 
  for good or ill 
 
  for good and ill 
 
 
Injunction: at once a command and an act of enjoining. In the caesura created by the 
two repetitive lines, we have precisely that: the evacuation of place --- “that dark” to 
“other dark”--- which is the space of the poem, from the poeticization of what comes 
to pass, the poetry. But this brusque evacuation, or veering off of the poem from 
poetry, is precisely that which also enjoins the primary image to the second by means 
of the turning point of oscillation between two figural postures, to play on Badiou’s 
phrase in “The Writing of the Generic” (265). In his analysis of Beckett’s prose in the 
1960s, Badiou asserts that “the figural poem of postures of the subject” gradually 
comes to take the place of conventional novelist functions such as description and 
narration. Beckett’s prose becomes geared towards enumerating the occurrences of 
the subject in its possible positions: 
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Prose was no longer able to sustain its usual “novelist” 
functions, that is, description and narration . . . Such is 
the disposition of the fictive functions of prose that 
leads me to speak of the poem. And the stakes of this 
poetics, as regards the subject, no longer concern the 
question of its identity . . .  At issue are rather 
occurrences of the subject, of its possible positions, of 
the enumeration of its figures. Rather than by the 
never-ending and futile fictive reflection on self, the 
subject is now indicated by the variety of the 
dispositions it enters in dealing with encounters, with 
the “what is happening”, with all that supplements 
being in the instantaneous surprise of the Other. (265) 
 
Badiou locates a poetic surfacing in Beckett’s prose that bespeaks figurative stances 
of the subject in its postural configurations. These figural postures withdraw from the 
identity of self into the enumeration of its possibility: such withdrawal is the force of 
subtraction that moves prose under the texture of the poetic. In a gesture of abrupt 
reordering, interruption in “one dead of night” short-circuits not only space, but also 
the temporal structure of the poem into two figural postures divided by the injunction 
of repetition. In what follows from “in the dead still” of the second line, the primary 
figural posture is constituted by “he looked up/from his book”, but in the second 
figural posture, we have instead “his book as by/a hand not his” after the repetition of 









one dead of night 
in the dead still 
he looked up 
from his book 
 
from that dark 






in the dead still 
 
till afar 
  his book as by 
  a hand not his 
  a hand on his 
  faintly closed 
 
  for good or ill 
 
  for good and ill 
 
Fig. 6 Repetition and Figural Postures in “one dead of night” 
 
 The oscillation, and ultimately in Rimbaldian poetics the decision, is not only 
between subject and object (he/his), nor between movement and stasis (looked/book), 
but two temporal possibilities: the first being disappearance, and the second being 
termination.  The termination in the secondary figurative posture derives not only 
from the interruptive and consecutive repetition of the two lines which elides and 
excises the space of the poem, but also from the metric symmetry of the ending which 
caps off the second figural posture in repetition. Notice that the second image emerges 
from the temporal opening of repetition between “in the dead still” and “till afar”, but 
is further constituted by two pairs of repeated fragments “a hand ___ his” and “for 
good ___ ill” within the last five lines. The effect of this repetition, another instance 








of interruption, is not of closure but termination: what we have here is not an 
evacuation of place from poetry as in the previous instance of repetition, but an 
evacuation of time. Time is shaved off from a disappearance to a termination. This is 
because in the ending five lines of the poem, we have not only a metric symmetry, but 
a syntactical inflection with “faintly close” as the oscillating pivot: 
 
a hand not his 
a hand on his 
faintly closed 
 
for good or ill 
 
for good and ill 
 
 
Fig. 7 Figural posture of termination in “one dead of night” 
 
Here we have a folding of the second figural posture upon itself: four syllables upon 
four syllables, repetition upon repetition, and as we will investigate later, substitution 
upon substitution (not, on/ or, and). This metric and syntactical folding is one of 
termination where the materiality of word is reduced and emphasized through its 
functional inflexions. Consider, in contrast, the ending of the first figural posture up 
till the repeated “in the dead still”: 
 
from that dark 



















What we have in the last three lines is a metric diminution from three to two syllables 
juxtaposed with an insistent alliteration (till/taper/the) that is then wiped off violently 
with “in the dead still” which overturns sound, metre and as we have seen, image and 
time. The disappearance of the first figural posture is not allowed, and at that juncture 
of its receding, an interruption of the second figural posture is imposed, from which 
we will reach termination rather than nothingness. The fragment of disappearance is 
absorbed into the fragmented of termination; this absorption is the decision of 
interruption that nothing was ever undecidable. In the contour of ruin that is left of the 
imposed figural posture of termination, we see not the resuscitation of the figural 
posture of disappearance, but rather, its reduction. To reinstate: in interruption, 
fragment reduces fragment in producing the fragmented. The fragment of truth is 
produced in the brutal decision of that reduction in the name of interruption. 
 
Second Interruptive Operation: Substitution 
 The flight of the fragment in the schema of interruption lies in the deception of 
the promise, which as a “point of flight”, allows the poem to escape from the poetry 
of the poem (Badiou “Rimbaud” 68). This escaping is framed through the injunction 
of repetition and enacted through the second method of interruption: substitution. As 
briefly mentioned above, this substitution takes place in the last five lines of the 
poem, where “a hand not his” is immediately followed by “a hand on his”, and “for 
good or ill” is followed, after a line space, by “for good and ill”.  In the first instance, 
the substitution of an adverb with a preposition inverts pure identity into a gesture of 
comfort, whereas in the second instance, the substitution of a conjunction for another 
conflates possibility into simultaneity. In both instances, the rupture of substitution 
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results in a conflation of time that appears to inherently draw back from the decisive 
and divisive rupture of interruption. What substitution enacts here is not paradox, but 
instead, the negative trace of the escaped, the poetry left behind. In the turn of that 
linguistic swiping, twice, we have the abrupt movement of flight and the trace of the 
departed as mark. Substitution as interruption enacts the flight of the fragment 
because it exhibits, in the space of a remnant of fragmented repetition, a flight that is 
done with, and done with because infinite. Like the finger of the glove turned inside 
out in Merleau-Ponty’s “The Intertwining --- The Chiasm”, interruption likewise 
operates through the movement of the chiasm within which the fragment circulates as 
temporal marker: 
 
Reversibility: the finger of the glove that is turned 
inside out --- There is no need of a spectator who 
would be on each side. It suffices that from one side I 
see the wrong side of the glove that is applied to the 
right side, that I touch the one through the other 
(double “representation” of a point or plane of the 
field) the chiasm is that: the reversibility ---  
 
 . . . The only “place” where the negative would really 
be is the fold, the application of the inside and the 
outside to one another, the turning point --- (Merleau-
Ponty 263 - 264) 
 
 
The nothingness of the flight, which carries with it the infinite and the idea, is turned 
over for us as the linguistic face of a substituted word: substitution conceals within its 
swift rupture the hinge, or the turning point, of the oscillation between the Two in the 
schema of interruption. The poetry as remnant is thus the negative trace of the 
evacuated poem. It carries in it, as fragmented, a fragment of that flight which it 
neither rejoins nor divorces, but merely attests to as the wrong side in that fold of 
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interruption. This is the mark of decision for Rimbaud: that nothing was ever 
undecidable even in the face of too much being lost. In “one dead of night” it is not 
only the possibility of disappearance that is lost through repetition, but the attainment 
of that fragment of eternity in the flight of the poem that is only captured as remainder 
through substitution. What is lost between the negation or nullity of “a hand not his” 
and “for good or ill”, and the comfort or conflation of “a hand on his” and “for good 
and ill”, is the fragment of truth conjoining these incompatible universes that 
interruption is impatient to seize precisely because this truth is absent.  But this is the 
Now of interruption, the doubled gesture of impatience, which exposes the human in 
all its rashness and desire. As the impetuous shadow of exception it will neither wait 
for the deference of thought, nor the circulation of the fragment to eventually 
encounter the hinge of the chiasm in liberating truth. In interruption, the chiasm is 
encountered all the time in those pockets of ruin left behind by the evacuated or 
extinguished of interruption. The mark of poetry that goes on, notwithstanding, is the 
testament of reversibility, which like the bulb of time in Merleau-Ponty, swells in 
dominant segments with uneven edges. 
 
Third Interruptive Operation: Space 
 These swellings are not only figurative in “one dead of night”, but are in fact 
materially realized as spaces in between the stanzas. These spaces divide the poem 
into seven distinct parts according to the number of lines in each stanza, thus giving 
us the schema: 4 – 2 – 3 – 1 – 5 – 1 – 1. There are three main characteristics of space 
in this poem. First, it punctuates the poem with gaps, or shifts, of silences to further 
emphasize or add on to the rhythm constituted by the metre of the words. For 
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instance, the gap between the second and the third stanza (2 – 3) gives a slight lilt or 
breath that becomes a prelude to the metric diminution of the third stanza in its 
transition from the second stanza which had augmented to a line of five syllables:    
 
from that dark 







Fig. 9 Punctuative space in “one dead of night” 
 
The gap in this instance becomes a lilt or a fall in time between two different spaces 
characterized by their distinct metric conditions. The function of space here is thus 
largely punctuative, and sometimes constitutive, in sound and rhythm. However, 
space is sometimes punctuation itself, as in the case of the space that immediately 
follows the repeated line “in the dead still”. As previously established, the repetition 
of “in the dead still” followed by another repetition “till afar” at once conjoins and 
excises the second figural posture from the first through the injunction of repetition. 













one dead of night 
in the dead still 
he looked up 
from his book 
 
from that dark 






in the dead still 
 
till afar 
  his book as by 
  a hand not his 
  a hand on his 
  faintly closed 
 
  for good or ill 
 
  for good and ill 
 
Fig. 10 Space as punctuation  in “one dead of night” 
 
 The time and space of the poem that has been evacuated from poetry happens in that 
space which in its complete silence is not a representation but a presentation of 
evacuation. But not enough, for this silence is not only complete, it is dead. A dead 
silence: space is ruin. In the gap between the last two lines “for good or ill” and “for 
good and ill” we have the moment of swiping that substitution enacts as rupture. This 
debris of interruption has no other name besides ruin; the space as silence is the 
testament and witness to this ruin: 
 
 












a hand not his 
a hand on his 
faintly closed 
 
for good or ill 
 








Fig. 11 Space as ruin in “one dead of night” 
 
 
 This is the “right side” of Merleau-Ponty’s glove turned inside out, but because it is a 
flight that has left, it is no longer there. To show ruin as flight: this is the interruption 
of space and the chiasm of interruption. In Beckett’s “one dead of night” we have 
seen how fragment reduces fragment and leaves behind the fragmented through three 
methods of interruption: repetition, substitution and space. Fragment as line, word and 
space is reduced, reproduced and left behind in the rupture of interruption as the 
remainder of the fragmented through time (figural posture of termination) and space 
(space as ruin). This is a remainder that, in its instantaneous seizing of undecidability, 
leaves as a mark of the fragmented a testament to Rimbaud’s claim that nothing was 
ever undecidable. But more imminently, this is a fragmented that belies an insistent 
retrieval of the human, or what is left of the human in face of a blank. Salvation in 
failure; Beckett shores up beside Rimbaud albeit in much murkier waters. That 
Badiou’s method and Merleau-Ponty’s theory enables one to read in Beckett’s poem a 
glimpse of this ethical condition of living on: this is the flight of the fragment that 














crux of the chiasm that we now turn to in reading Ohio Impromptu in the interval of 
“neither” and “one dead of night”.  
 






















Chapter 5   A Notion of Time: Ohio Impromptu 
The art of the theatre is doubtless the only art that must 
endeavour to complete an eternity by means of the 
instantaneousness it lacks. The theatre goes from 
eternity to time, not the other way around.  
             --- Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics 
 
 It is with such a grand proclamation from Badiou that one endeavours to 
understand the circulation of time in Ohio Impromptu. From eternity to time and back, 
that is the notion of time that operates in Beckett’s late dramaticule of 1980. Briefly 
stated, one argues that the circulation of time in Ohio Impromptu is a chiasm 
characterized with “neither” on one end and “one dead of night” on the other. The 
juncture of non-coincidence where the loops intersect is what marks the ending 
silence of Ohio Impromptu: that brief glimpse of eternity where “in a figure brimming 
over with nostalgia, one salutes in what one will never see again” (Badiou, 
“Rimbaud” 78 – 79). It is in Beckett’s Reader and Listener that such a notion is 
enacted, not only in image, but in time. 
 To recapitulate briefly, we have seen how the schemas of exception and 
interruption operate through Beckett’s “neither” and “one dead of night”. But not only 
through, for Beckett’s words give these schemas a figment of time, which in its 
circulation through the mark of the letter, belies the movement of the fragment that 
lends itself to the structure of the chiasm. The interaction of these three writers has 
allowed us to understand two truth procedures from which the Idea, or a fragment of 
truth, is enacted through two very different temporal circumstances. The 
characteristics of each scheme are briefly summarized as follows: 
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Schema of exception: 
 
1. Fragment resuscitates fragment. The fragment 
undergoes a tedious process of exception from 
fragment as wreckage, to movement of fragmenting 
as thought-event, into the site of the black-grey as 
fragmented, and finally liberated through flight as a 
fragment of eternity, while relapsed upon the 
original letter as a fragment of the word. 
 
2. The chiasm of the fragment is thus encountered at 
this hinge of resuscitation whereupon it regenerates 
itself. Time is therefore seen as one huge circular 
course in which it is not recursive, but is instead 
reversible with the invisible hinge of reversibility 
hidden by the node of time and realized in the time 
of the Idea, intuitus mentis.  
 
3. The flight of the fragment occurs as the culmination 
of this truth procedure when the fragment of 
candour evacuates from the familiar and the 
familial through the site of the black-grey. 
 
Schema of interruption 
 
1. Fragment reduces fragment. The fragment of the 
poem is evacuated, excised or ruptured from the 
poetry at the instant of interruption, leaving the 
remnant of poetry as the indelible fragmented 
contour of ruin. The Idea, unlike exception, is not 
liberated as a culmination of a truth procedure, but 
is instantly realized at the gesture of interruption as 
imperative, which is one characterized by 
impatience and deception. 
 
2. The chiasm of the fragment is thus encountered 
repeatedly and accumulatively at these junctures of 
interruption. Temporal movement in a poem of 
interruption can be likened to a bulb of time in 
which instants of reversibility at these ruptures of 
interruption swell up at dominant regions, creating 






3. The flight of the fragment occurs at these edges of 
atemporality where all that is observed is the 
negative trace of flight left behind in the fragmented 
ruin of poetry as a result of interruption. 
 
If one had to graphically represent the temporal circumstances of these two schemas 
through which the fragment flows, then the following distinction between a vertical 
and lateral composition of the chiasmus will suffice:  
Temporal flow of the fragment in “neither”       Temporal flow of the fragment in “one   




Blue lines mark the flight of the fragment exterior to 
the space of the poem, while black lines mark the 
movement of the fragment within the space of the 
poem; the blue and black lines in being linked as one 
continuous line shows the chiasm of the fragment, 
wherein the intersection between the colours is the 
hinge of the chiasm 
 
Fig. 12 Temporal Flow of the Fragment in “neither” and “one dead of night” 
 
In “neither”, the operation of exception is simultaneous with the flow of the chiasm 
through the entire temporal contour of the poem, but in “one dead of night”, the 
operations of interruption only occur at the instances at the hinge of the chiasm where 
the poem escapes as flight and leaves behind the fragmented contour of poetry. This 
poetry because fragmented and never resuscitated is thus rendered a “contour of ruin” 
(a dotted black line), whereas in exception we have a “contour of nothingness” (a full 
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black line) wherein the flight relapses upon the original trace of the event and 
recapitulates the letter, thus regenerating the poem. The flight of the fragment is 
rendered in its incompleteness or disappearance (always a dotted blue line) because it 
is never fully realized: in the case of exception is it kept at a distance through the 
undecidability of the event, and in interruption it is only glimpsed through the 
negative trace of flight left behind from the rupture. To push the schematization 
further, one can say that time in “neither” consists of a chiasm of regeneration where 
the atemporal Idea feeds back upon the temporal letter, whereas time in “one dead of 
night” consists of chiasms of rupture where the temporal letter suffers, constantly and 
immediately, at the expense of a glimpse of the atemporal Idea. In exception we have 
the deferment of the “after”; in interruption we have the instantaneity of the “now”. 
 What does it mean, therefore, to say that time in Ohio Impromptu operates 
through the chiasm with “neither” on one end, and “one dead of night” on the other? 
This claim entails three strands of explanation of which I will explicate in succession 
for the rest of the chapter. 
 
Strange Loop as Doubled Chiasm 
 First, the flow of the fragment in Ohio Impromptu straddles the movement and 
function of both schemas of exception and interruption. This is what most critics refer 
to as the strange loop of time in which what happens on stage and what is being read 
by Reader seems to catch up, overlap and exceed each other constantly. These 
intersections and veering off of temporalities can in fact be given a firmer structure 
than a mere “strange loop”. This structure consists of the chiasm as relationship 
between simultaneity and reversibility; the relationship is the movement between. 
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More precisely, it is the movement between the simultaneity and reversibility of two 
different temporal conditions both further marked by the chiasm of the fragment: the 
vertical temporal schema of exception wherein the patient deferment of the “after” is 
observed, and the lateral temporal schema of interruption wherein the instantaneity of 
the “now” is brutally felt through the ruin of rupture. The strange temporal loop in 
Ohio Impromptu is therefore constituted through a doubled chiasm akin to Merleau-
Pont’s explication of the flesh of thought as the Ineinander of time. The constant 
interruptive knocks of Listener makes up most of the uneven edges in the schema of 
interruption while the aural narrative that Reader reads makes up the main movement 
of the schema of exception. Listener’s knocks constantly and insistently bear holes 
into the movement of both Reader’s narrative and narration, resulting in a constant re-
winding and re-iteration of a fragmented narrative. Once again, fragment reduces 
fragment in interruption. On the other hand, fragment resuscitates fragment in 
Reader’s aural narrative through wreckage of the word. This is evident right from the 
start of the play: 
R: [Reading.] Little is left to tell. In a last --- 
[L knocks with left hand on table.] 
Little is left to tell.  
[Pause. Knock.] 
In a last attempt to obtain relief he moved from 
where they had been so long together to a single 
room on the far bank. From its single window 
he could see the downstream extremity of the 
Isle of Swans. 
[Pause.] 
Relief he had hoped would flow from 
unfamiliarity. Unfamiliar room. Unfamiliar 
scene. Out to where nothing ever shared. Back 
to where nothing ever shared. From this he had 





Listener’s knocks not only fragment the flow of the aural narrative but also the stasis 
of the visual image where both men are seated unmoving. The instantaneity of the 
Now jerks the visual image out of its stagnated still and the aural narrative out of its 
flow through the gesture of interruption. With uneven edges the temporal schema of 
interruption asserts itself in dominant regions, leaving behind the contour of ruin both 
visually and aurally. In contrast, Reader’s aural narrative is largely constituted by the 
movement of the fragment into fragmenting through the wreckage of the word. In the 
above instance, this is most clearly seen in the paragraph on unfamiliarity where the 
lack of “this” in the line “From this he had once half hoped some measure of relief 
might flow” is constituted by the trace of unfamiliarity that shores up through the 
abolished place (unfamiliar room/ unfamiliar scene) and time (out to nothing/ back to 
nothing). The unfamiliarity is precisely the lack constituted as the interval between the 
words breaking up and recaptured through the movement of fragmenting: fragmenting 
moves the fragment into the suspension of the vanishing of an event already 
abolished. As the poetics of the lack of lack, exception works through the deferment 
of the event by circulating the fragment in the regeneration of time, and this is 










R: So the sad tale a last time told they sat on as though 
turned to stone. Through the single window dawn shed 
no light. From the street no sound of reawakening. Or 
was it that buried in who knows what thoughts they 
paid no heed? To light of day. To sound of 
reawakening. What thoughts who knows. Thoughts, 
no, not thoughts. Profounds of mind. Buried in who 
knows what profounds of mind. Of mindlessness. 
Whither no light can reach. No sound. So sat on as 
though turned to stone. The sad tale a last time told. 
[Pause.] 
Nothing is left to tell. 
[Pause. R makes to close book. 
Knock. Book half closed.] 
Nothing is left to tell.  
[Pause. R closes book. 
Knock. 
Silence. Five seconds. 
Simultaneously they lower their right hands to table, 
raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. 
Expressionless. 
Ten seconds. 
Fade out.] (288) 
 
Here the circulation of the fragment as fragmenting falls into the site of the black-grey 
as fragmented. In “neither” we have seen how the site of the black-grey “unspeakable 
home” performs foreclosure by un-tracing and evacuating from all familial relations 
to escape and relapse as fragment of eternity and word respectively, and in Ohio 
Impromptu it is the repeated utterance “Nothing is left to tell” that performs this act of 
isolation. As the site of the black-grey, which we have understood as that which 
merges the “black of wandering” and the “black of motionless” (Badiou, “Generic” 
256) and “can be called the nothing, or the void, and that has no other name” (257), 
the repeated utterance “Nothing is left to tell” thus withdraws presence into the 
unnameable lack as it evacuates the “nothing” from any remnant of trace in its very 
act of repetition. As an echo of nothing --- and here we have the doubled lack again --
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-, this “nothing” it is unable to vanish and is incapacitated to recall any original event, 
thus castrating the movement of fragmenting into the halting point of foreclosure as 
the fragmented. But it is at this juncture that we can begin to understand how the 
chiasmic relationship of reversibility and simultaneity acts upon the two temporal 
conditions associated with these two respective schemas. Notice that the movement of 
fragmenting into fragmented above depends on the act of repetition ushered by 
Listener’s knock --- the fragment of exception here subsists upon the fragment of 
interruption where they seem to be at once two faces of the same act. The interruptive 
knock appears to leave behind as contour of ruin a fragmented which is not only the 
debris of rupture, but is also at once the fragmented of exception wherein foreclosure 
sets in. Or again, in the “unfamiliarity” passage earlier encountered, the trace of 
unfamiliarity constituted through the very lack of trace in the abolishment of place 
(unfamiliar room/ unfamiliar scene) and time (out to nothing/ back to nothing) 
emerges through the interruptive force of linguistic substitution similar to “one dead 
of night”. Where in the poem we have analyzed the linguistic swiping of an adverb for 
a preposition (a hand not his / a hand on his) and a conjunction for the other (for good 
or ill / for good and ill) towards the end, in this case we have the linguistic swiping of 
noun for noun and preposition for preposition that reveals and revels in the negative 
trace at once left behind by the interruptive force of substitution and the distancing of 
the evacuated in exception. The gap in which this torsion of ruin is exposed as space 
in “one dead of night” as the third method of interruption is here transposed (like 
Mallarmé’s “some sheets”) as the visual image of the play onstage. As an image of 
stasis it characterizes the patient flow of exception, but as an image of interruption 
through which Listener’s knock is embedded and hosted, it likewise characterizes the 
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impatient rupture of interruption. This is how the strands of reversibility and 
simultaneity of these two temporal conditions appear to cross and align at fleeting 
moments of the play, giving the audience the experience of a strange temporal loop. 
However, the intersection of this strange loop is only realized at the ending silence of 
the play where the flight of the chiasm is enacted at once through both schemas of 
exception and interruption. This leads us to the second strand of the argument. 
 
Flight and Intersection in Final Silence 
The divisive and sometimes overlapping flow of the fragment between the 
reversibility and simultaneity of interruption and exception finds a brief solace of 
conflation in the ending silence. This silence is the hinge of the chiasm between these 
two temporal worlds where the fragment of Idea that escapes from both schemas is 
realized through the thought-event, intuitus mentis. This is the force of theatre: unlike 
in poetry or prose, it realizes this intersection of the chiasm of both temporal worlds 
simultaneously in time and space, visually and aurally. The silence that is heard at the 
end of the play is at once seen and staged as the space of ruin. This is the space in 
which the flight of the fragment in interruption leaves as silence the negative imprint 
of a flight that has left, and it is also the space in which the flight of the fragment in 
exception leaves as silence the relapse of the letter upon flight’s departure as a 
fragment of candour. In the case of interruption, the ending silence is perceived as the 
complete ruin of the word because the interruptive force of repetition, on both counts 
of the final knock and the lack of a following utterance, fails completely and thus 




Nothing is left to tell. 
[Pause. R makes to close book. 
Knock. Book half closed.] 
Nothing is left to tell.  
[Pause. R closes book. 
Knock. 
Silence. Five seconds. 
Simultaneously they lower their right hands to table, 
raise their heads and look at each other. Unblinking. 
Expressionless. 
Ten seconds. 
Fade out. (288) 
 
Theatre here has the power to enact what was only visualized as material space in the 
ending of “one dead of night”. Where space is ruin as a visual evacuation in the poem, 
space is ruin and ruined in time both visually and aurally in Ohio Impromptu. This is 
seen not just in the case of interruption but also in exception. As previously 
established, the repeated utterance “Nothing is left to tell” castrates the movement of 
fragmenting into the fragmented of the site of black-grey whereupon the schema of 
isolation acts upon the foreclosed term. This rupture of isolation where the foreclosed 
term is broken off from all familial associations and evacuated from the context of its 
utterance is ultimately enacted in the space of the ending silence. Silence is the 
realization in time and space of the idea of “nothing is left to tell” because it is the 
lack of this lack, and like the doubled interruptive force of repetition mentioned 
above, it is a doubled lack that fails to trace anything completely and therefore 
perfectly. It is nothing, no-thing, blank. In this complete isolation, the fragment of the 
idea is enacted and therefore escapes as flight a fragment of eternity, while at the 
same time this “nothing” as letter relapses upon the hollow of silence the original 
grain of utterance where silence in its enacted presence, speaks. The flash of speaking 
in silence: this is the turning point of the chiasm where the silence of both exception 
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and interruption is realized as a node of time in the simultaneous and the recursive. 
This is the tip of Merleau-Ponty’s glove turned inside out, where the wrong side 
meets the right side at that momentary turning that once grasped as idea, is 
immediately lost to eternity. Intuitus mentis:  the merging of this silence makes the 
fragment take flight.  
 
The Inter-textual Fragment 
 Lastly, that the temporality of Ohio Impromptu operates as and at the chiasm 
of these two poems and their respective schemas suggests a relationship not of mere 
adaptation, but of inter-textuality. The notion of the fragment flows through these 
three works through the concept of the chiasm which ultimately constitutes a notion 
of time that is not linear or circular, but chiasmic. This notion of time founded on an 
inter-textual structure of the fragment thus allows one to read the play from eternity to 
time and back, to recapitulate on Badiou’s declaratory sentence introduced at the start 
of the chapter. But more than that: the flight of the fragment enables one to read from 
eternity to time and back at the crux of the word of Beckett, Badiou and Merleau-
Ponty. The figures of Reader and Listener conflated with the ending silence of Ohio 
Impromptu are not only a figment of the figurative postures of “one dead of night” or 
the corporeal vanishings of the impenetrable self and unself of “neither”, but are 
indeed also the inflexion and reflection of the word upon the reading subject. At the 
heart of this reflection which we call reading is the responsibility that the eye that 
meets the word must remain faithful to the human that lies behind it.  
 By way of conclusion, I suggest an image of this eye that meets the word. This 
is an eye that oscillates between the temporal fragments of the two poems and the 
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literary fragments of these three writers, but it does so in the absolute stillness of 
silence and stasis in the concluding image of Ohio Impromptu. In this conjunction of 
oscillation and stillness we have the eye that turns inward towards its own body. The 
eye is the hinge of the chiasm that reveals the living body at the crux of word and 
image, and this revelation takes place only in the possibility of the image. Like 
Merleau-Ponty’s infinite set of reflections between two mirrors, this image has no 
reality beyond inflexion and reflection as image. Such is the image of Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Oscillator. Nancy traces this word back to two origins: first, to oscillum 
which designates a small mouth, and second, to a “small mask of Bacchus hung in the 
vines as a scarecrow” (73). The Oscillator that swings in the wind of the vines thus 
oscillates between the mouth and the mask, the silent and the spoken: 
 
The Oscillator, then, swings between mouth and face, 
between speech and vision, between the emission of 
sense and the reception of form. But what appears to 
move toward an encounter does not do so at all: on the 
contrary, the mouth and the look are turned forward 
and are parallel, turned into the distance, toward an 
infinite perpetuation of their double and 
incommunicable position. Between mouth and eye, the 
entire face oscillates. 
 
And yet, the Oscillator does not cease to knock back 
and forth, to leap or to dance between the two, touching 
both of them. It wants to make the mask speak and it 
wants to give speech a mask. (73) 
 
In its perpetuation of oscillating movement, the image recedes into its own movement 
as image itself. This is an image of the unutterable blank between two incompatible 
universes called possibility. In this blank, the eye looks in the grain of undecidability 
and gives it a face. This face rises from the ground of theatre in the final silence of 
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Ohio Impromptu. The fragment gives time the face of its own undecidability, but the 
moment we realize this undecidability as our own frightful mortality, this face is 
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